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Abstract 
This thesis provides an analysis of the Eurozone‟s crisis management during the 
European debt crisis from a Neorealist perspective. It assesses the explanatory 
power of Neorealism for the counter-measures taken in response to the European 
debt crisis. The main argument is that in times of crisis, the member states of the 
European Union may fall back to Neorealist behavior, despite any integrating 
efforts made under non-crisis conditions. The thesis combines quantitative and 
qualitative analysis with the quantitative part descriptively assessing the financial 
power relations within the Eurozone and the qualitative part providing evidence 
for a crisis management congruent with Neorealist predictions. It is shown that the 
two financially most powerful states during the European debt crisis, Germany 
and France, decisively shaped the implementation of the EFSF, the ESM, and the 
European Fiscal Compact. Furthermore, evidence is given that those three 
counter-measures were implemented outside of the European Union legal 
framework and designed after intergovernmental premises. The thesis thus 
concludes that the three most important counter-measures to the European debt 
crisis can be explained and analyzed through the theory of Neorealism. 
  
 
Key words: Neorealism, financial state power, European debt crisis, crisis 
management, Eurozone 
Word count: 19,987 
 
 
  
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Development of absolute amounts of intergovernmental lending in the Eurozone…… 39 
Figure 2: Share of intergovernmental loans in the Eurozone from 2009 to 2014………………... 41 
Figure 3: Development of financial instability in the Eurozone from 2009 to 2014…………….. 44 
Figure 4: Financial state power distribution in the Eurozone in the years 2010 and 2014………. 47 
Figure 5: Share of guarantee commitments to the EFSF………………………………………… 57 
Figure 6: Share of capital subscription to the European Stability Mechanism…………………... 62 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: State-rankings of financial stability from 2009 to 2015…………………………………45 
Table 2: Documents and Data Analyzed………………………………………………………….53 
  
Table of Contents 
1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 6 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question ...................................................................................... 6 
1.2 Historical Perspective ...................................................................................................... 7 
1.3 Previous Research ........................................................................................................... 8 
1.3.1 Financial Power .......................................................................................................... 9 
1.3.2 Neorealist Study of the European Union................................................................... 10 
2 Approaching the Concept of Financial State Power ................................. 12 
2.1 Offensive Understanding of Financial State Power....................................................... 12 
2.2 Defensive Understanding of Financial State Power ...................................................... 14 
2.3 Summarizing Conceptualization ................................................................................... 16 
3 Neorealism – Theory, Criticism, and Predictions...................................... 17 
3.1 Neorealist Theory .......................................................................................................... 17 
3.2 Neorealism and the European Union ............................................................................. 19 
3.2.1 Anarchy ..................................................................................................................... 19 
3.2.2 Cooperation ............................................................................................................... 20 
3.2.3 Supranationality versus Intergovernmentalism ......................................................... 20 
3.3 Neorealist Predictions of the Eurozone‟s Crisis Management ...................................... 22 
3.3.1 Anarchy ..................................................................................................................... 23 
3.3.2 Cooperation ............................................................................................................... 24 
3.3.3 A Supranational or an Intergovernmental Solution? ................................................. 24 
3.4 Hypothesis ..................................................................................................................... 25 
4 Research Strategy and Methodology .......................................................... 27 
4.1 The Case Study Research Strategy ................................................................................ 27 
4.2 Case Selection ............................................................................................................... 28 
4.3 Limitations and Potential Biases ................................................................................... 30 
5 Quantitative Analysis ................................................................................... 32 
5.1 Quantitative Research Design and Method ................................................................... 32 
5.1.1 Operationalization ..................................................................................................... 33 
5.1.2 Data Collection and Analysis .................................................................................... 36 
5.1.3 Limitations and Potential Biases ............................................................................... 38 
5.2 Creditor Status ............................................................................................................... 39 
5.3 Financial (In)Stability.................................................................................................... 44 
5.4 Comparing Both Indicators ........................................................................................... 46 
5.5 Interpreting the Financial Power Distribution in the Eurozone ..................................... 48 
6 Qualitative Analysis...................................................................................... 51 
  
6.1 Qualitative Research Design and Method ..................................................................... 51 
6.1.1 Data Analysis ............................................................................................................ 52 
6.1.2 Data Collection and Interpretation ............................................................................ 53 
6.1.3 Limitations and Potential Biases ............................................................................... 54 
6.2 Reaching Agreement in International Negotiations ...................................................... 55 
6.3 European Financial Stability Facility ............................................................................ 56 
6.3.1 Implementation Process, Coalition Building, and Prevalence of Anarchy ............... 57 
6.3.2 The Institutional Design: Intergovernmental or Supranational? ............................... 59 
6.4 European Stability Mechanism...................................................................................... 61 
6.4.1 Implementation Process, Coalition Building, and Prevalence of Anarchy ............... 62 
6.4.2 The Institutional Design: Intergovernmental or Supranational? ............................... 64 
6.5 European Fiscal Compact .............................................................................................. 64 
6.5.1 Implementation Process, Coalition Building, and Prevalence of Anarchy ............... 65 
6.5.2 The Institutional Design: Intergovernmental or Supranational? ............................... 67 
6.6 Summarizing Assessment .............................................................................................. 68 
7 Discussion ...................................................................................................... 69 
8 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 71 
9 Bibliography .................................................................................................. 73 
6 
 
1 Introduction 
This Master‟s thesis provides an analysis of the financial state power relations in 
the Eurozone and assesses the explanatory power of Neorealism for the counter-
measures taken in response to the European debt crisis. The main argument is that 
in times of crisis, the member states of the European Union may fall back to 
Neorealist behavior, despite any integrating efforts made under non-crisis 
conditions. By showing this, the thesis strives to contribute to the expansion of the 
Neorealist theory on the analytical body of the Eurozone. 
The thesis combines quantitative and qualitative analysis with the quantitative 
part descriptively assessing the financial power relations within the Eurozone and 
the qualitative part providing evidence for a crisis management congruent with 
Neorealist predictions. Accordingly, the qualitative analysis is partly based on the 
quantitative analysis as the quantitative assessment of the financial power 
relations in the Eurozone establishes the basis for a profound understanding and 
traceability of state behavior during the crisis. 
 The thesis may contribute to the field of Global Studies by enhancing the 
knowledge of an event with such global repercussions as the European debt crisis 
and by contributing to the understanding of state behavior in international crisis 
situations. 
 
 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
When the European debt crisis hit the European Union member states were 
unprepared. The absence of any rules on how to counter such a crisis took the 
states by surprise and left them unsure of how to deal with the ever-increasing 
severity of the crisis. The resulting inaction in turn contributed to the volatility of 
the international financial markets and led to immense pressure resting on the 
member states of the Eurozone to solve the crisis as fast as possible (Gianviti et 
al., 2010).  
This thesis argues that in this time of crisis and confusion, the Eurozone states 
stepped out of the institutionalized framework of the European Union which had 
turned out to be insufficient in dealing with the crisis and implemented counter-
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measures that were achieved under anarchy and reflected the financial power 
relations within the Eurozone. As a result, it will be argued that, although 
Neorealism is said to not be applicable to the European Union framework, it 
offers a considerable amount of explanatory power to the international policy 
making in reaction to the recent European debt crisis.  
In order to find evidence for this argument, the thesis is based on two main 
research questions. Those are, firstly, “How was financial state power distributed 
among the states of the Eurozone between 2009 and 2014?” and, secondly, ”Can 
the fiscal counter-measures taken in the course of the European debt crisis be 
explained by the theory of Neorealism?”.  
 
 
1.2 Historical Perspective 
In order to set the historical framework for the following analysis, the subsequent 
paragraphs present some of the particularities of the European debt crisis with a 
focus on the development of the crisis and the reasons for its special severity. 
In 2007, a global economic and financial crisis took shape, the implications of 
which the global community is still dealing with to this day. What started as a 
local economic crisis became a multidimensional crisis in recent years that still 
has significant effects on the worldwide banking system, global debt structures, 
economic growth and currencies. The starting point was a global recession that 
had its roots in the US subprime mortgage crisis from 2007. Because banks all 
around the world had invested in US mortgages, the bankruptcy of US banks had 
global repercussions leading to a worldwide financial and banking crisis.  
Although the crisis affected many states, the European Union and especially its 
member states which share the currency of the Euro, the Eurozone, were 
particularly exposed to the crisis. As the subprime crisis in the US grew in 
severity, banks in the European Union were heavily affected because they were 
closely involved in business overseas. Eventually, the severe pressure on the 
European financial system led to the bankruptcy of many banks (Helleiner, 2014, 
p. 4). Since a number of those banks were considered as being critical to the 
financial system, however, several Eurozone states and the European Central 
Bank engaged in massive bank bailouts in order to prevent the system from 
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crashing. Additional to the bank bailouts, large-scale measures to support 
aggregate demand have been implemented in order to diminish the negative 
impact of the financial crisis. Bank bailouts and macroeconomic measures have 
been extremely costly and placed heavy burdens on the budgets of the Eurozone 
states. In order to deal with this burden, the states had to engage in massive 
lending which led to a sharp increase in public debt all over the Eurozone 
(Berlatsky, 2010). Although the sovereign debt crisis negatively affected all 
member states of the Eurozone, some member states, especially Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, and Portugal were more affected than others. Subsequently, joint 
measures by the Eurozone states and the European Central Bank were taken in 
order to tackle the impending danger of state bankruptcy. The severe financial and 
economic crises in several states would have forced those states into bankruptcy if 
they had not received the help of the international community. Even worse, the 
impending insolvency of Greece threatened to negatively affect the whole 
Eurozone due to its connectedness of financial systems and banking (Gocaj & 
Meunier, 2013, p. 241). Measures like the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Fiscal Compact, and the creation of a European Banking Union were 
initiated later on to deal with the effects of the crisis.  
 
Scholars and politicians agree that the crisis had immense negative effects on 
financial and economic systems all around the world. Eric Helleiner regards the 
financial crisis as the “worst global financial meltdown experienced since the 
early 1930s” (Helleiner, 2014, p. 1). There can be no doubt that the crisis had a 
crucial impact on the political and economic landscape of the European Union and 
especially the Eurozone.  
 
 
1.3 Previous Research 
Because of its regional as well as global importance, the European political and 
economic landscape in the aftermath of the financial crisis has been object of 
extensive research during recent years. The following paragraphs will present a 
short overview about the academic literature dealing with the European debt crisis 
and will put a special emphasis on the existing research on financial state power. 
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At the end of the chapter, it will be shown that the study conducted in this thesis 
strives to close two existing gaps in the academic literature on financial power 
relations and the theoretical study of the European Union. 
 
1.3.1 Financial Power 
What becomes apparent when dealing with financial power in an academic 
context is that the term „financial power‟ is understood in quite a broad sense. In 
large parts of academic literature financial power is understood as any power that 
derives from a „financial‟ background. There seems to be no generally accepted 
conceptualization of financial power. Naturally, this leads to a range of widely 
differing studies that are to be located in the research of financial power 
Specifically in the context of the recent financial crisis, studies on financial 
power relations have shown, for example, that the amount of costs of the bank 
bailouts during the crisis were related to the power relations between the banking 
sectors and the state governments (Woll, 2014a; Woll, 2014b). Other scholars 
assessed how political structures limited the financial power of banks during the 
crisis (Pagoulatos, 2014) and how in return, power was used to prevent 
democratic control in order to protect financial markets during the crisis (Johal, 
Moran, & Williams, 2014). However, the majority of the research on financial 
power relations focusses on power relations between non-state actors, especially 
from the financial sector, and states. Only little research (see e.g. Donnelly, 2014) 
has been done on the financial power distribution at the state level.  
One of the few attempts to do so was conducted by Gregory Chin and Eric 
Helleiner (2008). The two scholars assessed China‟s increasing financial power in 
the international system by presenting an argument that its creditor position has 
enhanced the country‟s ability to influence the international financial arena (Chin 
& Helleiner, 2008). Chin and Helleiner relate China‟s prominent creditor position 
to its large reserves of foreign exchange and how it could potentially use these to 
manipulate the stability and value of other states‟ currencies (ibid., p. 91). Despite 
this source of power, Chin and Helleiner also highlight the potential downside of 
large foreign exchange reserves as it makes China more vulnerable to exchange 
rate risks and make the country dependent on the dollar, which is controlled by 
the US. 
10 
 
 
In general, there are two main kinds of studies of financial power in the academic 
literature to be located within the field of Political Science. This is, on the one 
hand, the study of financial power inherent to financial sectors. On the other hand, 
there are studies which focus on the assessment of the financial power of one or 
several states. The former category is often inspired by the significant power that 
financial systems have in relation to society and politics (e.g. Johal, Moran, & 
Williams, 2014; Woll, 2014b). This kind of power becomes most apparent 
whenever crises occur that have their origin in the financial system, as last 
happened during the financial crisis since 2007. The latter category of studies tries 
to explain how the presumed financial power of a certain state transforms into 
political power (e.g. Chin & Helleiner, 2008).  
This Master‟s thesis contributes to the existing research on financial power by 
providing an analysis which focuses solely on power between states. Furthermore, 
in the context of the lacking literature on financial state power, this thesis may 
contribute to an advancement of the theoretical understanding of financial state 
power for it creates a comprehensive conceptualization of financial state power 
and subsequently applies this conceptualization to an empirical case. 
 
1.3.2 Neorealist Study of the European Union 
Since its emergence, the European Community, and later the European Union, has 
been the object of several theoretical debates and corresponding attempts to 
understand and explain the European cooperation in a theoretical way. Naturally, 
one of the most prevalent theories of International Relations, Neorealism, had its 
own take at explaining the European cooperation as well. During the Cold War, 
Neorealist theory explained the emergence of a European confederation mainly by 
the states‟ attempt to create a strong opposition to the Soviet bloc (Collard-
Wexler, 2006, p. 415). 
After the end of the Cold War, however, many Neorealists predicted the end of 
the European project due to the absence of a balancing threat (Kissinger, 1994). 
When this prediction did not fulfill itself and European integration even deepened, 
the theory of Neorealism had more and more difficulty explaining the ongoing 
state cooperation in Europe (Collard-Wexler, 2006). The Maastricht agreement in 
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1991, for instance, which paved the way for the shared currency of the Euro, 
poses an anomaly that Neorealists struggle to explain (Grieco, 1996). The ongoing 
difficulties of Neorealism to explain the European integration even led other 
scholars to claim the failure of the theory and called for its rejection. Critics of 
Neorealism even asked, in the light of those difficulties, “Is anybody still a 
realist?” (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999, p. 54). 
However, instead of engaging in major reformulations of the theory to 
overcome its issues which the European Union, many Neorealists just refrained 
from dealing with the European Union which leaves an apparent lack of academic 
literature when it comes to empirical studies that strive to apply the theory of 
Neorealism to the European Union (Jørgensen, 2004; Hyde-Price, 2006). The 
main reason that so many Neorealist scholars decided to refrain from engaging 
with the European Union are the severe difficulties that the ongoing cooperation 
and integration of the European Union poses to the theory of Neorealism (Collard-
Wexler, 2006).  
Although some attempts have been made to explain the European Union from a 
Neorealist perspective, the European Union remains heavily under-theorized 
(Collard-Wexler, 2006, p. 398). Subsequently, the study conducted in this thesis 
contributes to the theoretical discussion of Neorealism‟s explanatory power for 
the special case of the European Union. 
 
As has been shown, this thesis contributes to the academic literature in a twofold 
way. Targeting the gaps identified above, the thesis aims to both contribute to the 
theoretical discussion about financial state power while simultaneously enhancing 
the explanatory power of Neorealism concerning the European Union. 
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2 Approaching the Concept of Financial 
State Power 
State power is one of the core concepts of several branches in international 
relations, not only Neorealism, and many theories have the notion of state power 
at the heart of their argumentation. However, although there is a considerable 
branch of academic literature that explores financial power in various empirical 
contexts, there is an apparent lack of literature that deals with financial state 
power in a theoretical way.  
The main stumbling block when approaching financial state power in a 
theoretical way is that the majority of literature focusses on discourses on state 
power in general, not on financial state power in particular. Furthermore, the 
discussion on state power is traditionally shaped by a focus on military power. For 
a long time, military power has been regarded as the only important source of 
state power in international relations (Baldwin, 2013). After the end of the Cold 
War, however, the scholarly discussion started to increasingly incorporate other 
sources of state power as well. Thus, although the emphasis of the following 
paragraphs is on financial state power, the traditional focus on military power as 
the primary source of state power should be borne in mind. 
In the following, several theoretical approaches to state power and especially 
financial state power will be presented. While giving an overview about some 
existing theoretical approaches to financial state power, a distinction will be made 
between an offensive and a defensive understanding of financial state power. 
Finally, the gathered definitional pieces will be merged into a conceptualization 
that is suitable for application in this thesis. 
 
 
2.1 Offensive Understanding of Financial State Power 
The classic Political Science definition of state power regards power as the ability 
of an actor causing another actor to do something that it would otherwise not do 
(Dahl, 1957; Baldwin, 2013). It is thus an offensive understanding of state power 
which relies on coercion as the mean to enforce one‟s own will. Deriving from 
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this offensive understanding of state power, there are a few scholars who tried to 
approach a definition of what is actually meant by financial state power. Some 
attempts are as broad as Albert O. Hirschman‟s (1945) conceptualization who 
states that “the power to interrupt commercial or financial relations with any 
country […] is the root cause of the influence or power position which a country 
acquires in other countries” (Hirschman, 1945, p. 16). Others focus on an 
approach to the concept rooted in the empirical measures that assemble financial 
state power. Daniel W. Drezner (2009), who interprets financial state power as 
solely deriving from creditor status, identifies classical measures for a creditor 
state to wield financial power over a debtor state. According to him, those 
measures are „dumping assets‟, reducing or stopping the purchase of new debt, 
shifting the composition of foreign holdings or devaluating the currency of the 
debtor (Drezner, 2009, p. 15). 
 
One of the few scholars who engaged with the concept of financial state power in 
a more in-depth way is Susan Strange. In her structural power approach, the 
access to and the ability to influence international financial structures is one of 
four sources of structural power (Strange, 1994). According to Susan Strange, the 
authority to decide on the granting of credit highly influences dependent actors in 
terms of their ability to spend money (Strange, 1994, p. 90). Since the creditor 
gets to decide on the conditions to which the debtor has to ensure the repayment 
of his liabilities, he finds himself in a powerful position towards the debtor. 
Another important factor that is attributed to Strange‟s concept of structural power 
in finance is the influence on exchange rates between currencies (Verdun, 2000, p. 
80). 
For Susan Strange, financial power thus derives from “the sum of all the 
arrangements governing the availability of credit plus all the factors determining 
the terms on which currencies are exchanged for one another” (Strange, 1994, p. 
90). The currency factor of Strange‟s conception of financial state power refers to 
the ability to conduct monetary policies with the goal of gaining a competitive 
advantage over another state. Currency intervention strategies are mostly intended 
to generate economic or fiscal advantages, respectively financial or economic 
power. Typical measures taken to influence a currency are extensive acts of 
buying foreign exchange while at the same time selling domestic currency in 
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order to devaluate the currency (Bird & Willett, 2011, p. 126). Additionally, 
interfering in foreign exchange markets with the goal of preventing a currency 
from appreciating can also be examples of wielding financial power related to 
currencies (Bird & Willett, 2011, p. 123). All these measures are designed to 
achieve or maintain a competitive advantage over another state by having an 
exchange rate of the own currency that favors the economic and financial goals of 
the respective state. The main advantage of devaluating the domestic currency is 
to keep “imports lower and exports higher than they would otherwise be” (Bird & 
Willett, 2011, p. 123). Thus, this aspect of financial power is immediately and 
closely related to economic state power.  
 
If one were to follow Susan Strange‟s structural power approach, financial state 
power results from the ability to influence the international financial structures. 
The two main components that a state needs to succeed with this task are a 
creditor status and/or the ability to influence currencies, respectively exchange 
rates. Although these two sources of financial state power do not have to exist 
concurrently, it is of benefit for a state to enhance the own capabilities on either 
dimension.  
In the special case of the Eurozone, the second factor, currencies, is of less 
importance. Since the Eurozone countries share the same currency, actions 
directed towards an influence of another state‟s currency with the goal of 
achieving a competitive advantage over said state are naturally pointless. The 
monetary union of the Eurozone thus negates the relevance of the Strangian 
second source of financial state power. Hence, for an analysis of the financial 
state power relations within the Eurozone, only the first indicator, creditor status 
bears explanatory power. 
 
 
2.2 Defensive Understanding of Financial State Power 
Although the offensive understanding of state power is undoubtedly the 
predominant one in the study of International Relations, some scholars point out 
that defensive forms of state power do exist. Corresponding contributions stem 
mainly from the field of Security Studies and focus on defensive state capabilities 
15 
 
that enable resistance to military coercion from other states. Relevant capabilities 
in this context represent “defensive power, invulnerability, the ability to resist 
harm intended by others” (Fischer, 1982, p. 205). 
 
Defensive state power in its military sense is then defined by Dietrich Fischer as 
follows: “An important component of national defense without threat to others is 
to make oneself less vulnerable, and to become less dependent on others, i.e., 
more self-reliant” (Fischer, 1982, p. 214). Although Dietrich Fischer clearly refers 
his statement to forms of military capabilities, his point of view can be readily 
transferred into the spheres of financial state power. Accordingly, in the context of 
finance, state power refers to any resources that enable a state to protect itself 
from harming financial influence. 
 
Corresponding financial resources can, for instance, be the holding of large 
currency reserves. Disposing of huge amounts of reserves enhances a countries 
ability to withstand currency crises and thus increases a state‟s autonomy (Chiu & 
Willett, 2014, p. 12). If a nation holds too large currency reserves, however, it 
reduces its flexibility to change the composition of its reserves without taking the 
risk of heavy financial repercussions (Chiu & Willett, 2014, p. 12f.).  
When pursuing this perception of defensive financial power even further, the 
stability of a state‟s financial system is directly linked to a state‟s ability to resist 
financial influences. Large and resilient financial resources, for example, can 
increase a country‟s financial stability and therefore enhance its financial power 
(Donnelly, 2014, p. 985). Apart from those readily measurable financial 
resources, such as currency reserves, financial stability also contains factors like 
the composition and soundness of the financial system within a state (Holló, 
Kremer, & Lo Duca, 2012). Since a stable financial system is more resilient to 
external (and internal) factors that could potentially harm the financial and 
economic well-being of a state, it bears a source of defensive financial state 
power.  
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2.3 Summarizing Conceptualization 
The review above has shown that there are two different forms of financial state 
power: an offensive and a defensive interpretation. Following those two 
conceptualizations, offensive financial state power can be understood as all 
financial measures or conditions that enable a state to cause another state to do 
something that it would otherwise not do. Correspondingly, defensive financial 
state power encompasses the ability to protect oneself from potentially harming 
financial influences. Because both definitions have strong arguments and can be 
seen as complementary, the following analysis will consider both forms of 
financial state power.  
 
An important question that has to be asked when discussing financial state power 
is the question whether it is always a zero-sum game or if there are certain 
conditions under which it becomes non-zero-sum. The answer to this question is 
highly dependent on the definition of state power which is applied. If financial 
state power is regarded in its offensive interpretation as the ability to cause 
another state to do something it would otherwise not do, financial state power 
would be rather a zero-sum game. This is grounded in the relational focus of this 
conceptualization of power. If financial state power is seen as being always 
relative, the gains of one state do result in another state‟s equal loss (Baldwin, 
1979, p. 187). Within its defensive definition, however, financial power may 
become a non-zero-sum game. If states increase, for instance, their financial 
stability, they become less vulnerable to financial crises. Although this would be 
defined as an increase in financial power, it would not be zero-sum because the 
increase of power is not accompanied by a simultaneous decrease of another 
state‟s financial power. 
 
Now that the conceptual basis for an analysis of financial state power has been 
given, the next chapter will set the foundation for the empirical analysis by 
introducing the research strategy and methodological framework of the study. 
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3 Neorealism – Theory, Criticism, and 
Predictions 
In order to provide a basis for an answer to the second research question, ”Can 
the fiscal counter-measures taken in the course of the European debt crisis be 
explained by the theory of Neorealism?”, the following paragraphs will present 
the theoretical foundation needed for such an assessment. Based on this, the 
difficulties of using Neorealism to explain the European Union will be subject to a 
critical assessment. Finally, it will be argued how Neorealism would predict the 
design of the Eurozone‟s crisis management, which will eventually lead to the 
formulation of a hypothesis. 
 
 
3.1 Neorealist Theory 
Although the discipline of International Relations offers a wide variety of schools 
of thought, there is no school that regards state power as more central than does 
the school of Realism and its reformulation, Neorealism. Realism has such a 
strong focus on power that it is even sometimes called „power politics‟ (Kadera & 
Sorokin, 2004, p. 212). Deriving from Realism, Neorealism emerged as one of the 
key perspectives on International Relations within the past decades. Although 
there are some crucial differences between the theories, Realism and Neorealism 
share the same set of basic premises. This is, firstly, the anarchic nature of the 
international system implying that there is no supervisory authority that could 
play a regulatory role. Secondly, (Neo-)Realists assume that states are uniform, 
homogeneous and rational actors and furthermore the only actors that matter on 
the international level (Waltz, 1979). Thirdly, states differ from each other only 
through their power potential. From a (Neo-)Realist perspective, power is the only 
thing that counts in the international system. It is the only thing that enables states 
to enforce their interests and to maintain their own security (Waltz, 1979). The 
preservation of this security is the primary concern of states. 
Apart from those similarities, Neorealism has some distinct assumptions. The 
central of these assumptions is the state‟s motivation to strive for power which, 
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for Neorealists, is caused by the structure of the international system. Because of 
the anarchic nature of the system, states can only ensure their survival and 
independence by being powerful enough to withstand the influence of other states. 
As a result, states continuously strive to maximize their power. This strong focus 
on the systemic nature of the international system is accompanied by the 
assumption that states always try to defend their position in the international 
system relatively to the other states. 
 
Neorealism assumes an international system in which every state‟s interest is 
solely its own survival and the maximization of its power. As a result, cooperation 
between states is extremely hard to achieve for two main reasons. The first is the 
states‟ fear of being cheated. Because cooperation under anarchy follows the rules 
of the prisoner‟s dilemma, defecting is the dominant strategy (Collard-Wexler, 
2006, p. 400). Secondly, states will not engage in cooperation if they fear that the 
relative gains of their cooperation partner will be higher than their own (Grieco, 
1988, p. 487). 
According to those assumptions, cooperation can only occur under certain 
circumstances. One of those situations is when a hegemon establishes rules or 
structures that negate the fear of cheating. Another is met when the number of 
states involved in an international negotiation is high and through cooperation, 
proportional relative gains could be realized (Collard-Wexler, 2006, p. 400). 
Finally, states can engage in cooperation if they are facing an external threat 
which impedes the ability of states to independently ensure their survival. This is 
especially a defensive Neorealist argument and assumes that in situations of high 
external threat, states may consider the risks of cooperation as being lesser than 
potential costs induced by the external threat (Collard-Wexler, 2006, p. 401). 
 
One important characteristic of Neorealist theory that should be borne in mind is 
its focus on military power as the most important; some scholars would even 
argue the only important, determinant of states‟ decision making. However, 
Neorealist literature has remarked that economic and financial gains are 
immediately tied to military power, as economic strength is a prerequisite for the 
funding of military capabilities (Snidal, 1991, p. 703). Thus, financial soundness 
as a requirement for economic strength is of interest to Neorealism as well. 
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3.2 Neorealism and the European Union 
As prevalent as the theory of Neorealism might be in the study of International 
Relations, it is, of course, not free from critique. Several scholars have pointed out 
that its state-centric view of international politics leads to major theoretical 
problems. One of those theoretical problems is the European Union. The political 
entanglement and the seemingly voluntary transfer of power to superordinate 
international institutions, like the European Commission and the European 
Parliament, represent a development that cannot be readily explained by 
Neorealism. Critics of Neorealism then pinpoint three major issues which 
Neorealism fails to explain in the framework of the European Union. Those are, 
firstly, the absence of anarchy, secondly, the progressive cooperation among the 
states of the European Union, and, thirdly, the ongoing transfer of sovereign rights 
to supranational institutions which is a process that seems to contrast Neorealist 
predictions. In the following, these three points of critique will be described in 
order to set the basis for the subsequent analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Anarchy 
It is especially Neorealism‟s most basic assumption, anarchy, which is widely 
conceived as not being applicable to the European context (Collard-Wexler, 
2006). Through the ongoing assignment of power to European institutions, the 
European Union has become a supranational organization with considerable 
decision-making authority. Instead of anarchy, the political Europe has 
subordinated itself under a semi-hierarchical ordering principle (Rosamond, 
2000). Many scholars argue that this entanglement can hardly be regarded as 
anarchy (Collard-Wexler, 2006). Anarchy in the understanding of Neorealism is 
defined as the absence of any „world government‟ or a similar authority which can 
impose rules and structure in the international system (Waltz, 1979, p. 88). This 
condition has been mitigated by the institutional framework of the European 
Union as it implemented several hierarchic structures that set the framework 
within which its member states have to operate. If anarchy is not given at the 
European level anymore, however, Neorealism fails to describe state behavior in 
this international system.  
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This critique has been picked up by Neorealist scholars who argue that it is still 
possible that the systemic pressure induced by anarchy determines the decisions 
of states under a semi-hierarchical system (Collard-Wexler, 2006, p. 420). The 
main argument here is that the framework of a semi-hierarchical system like the 
European Union only lowers the intensity of anarchy but does not change its 
underlying premises. If this would be the case, the explanatory power of 
Neorealism is dependent on the relative intensity of anarchy in any given 
situation. If anarchy is, in certain situations, less mitigated by the institutional and 
legal framework of the European Union, Neorealist theory gains explanatory 
power for those specific situations or events. 
 
3.2.2 Cooperation 
Closely related to the Neorealist assumption of anarchy is the ability of states to 
cooperate. The extent of inter-state cooperation both horizontally and vertically in 
the European Union constitutes an anomaly to Neorealism (Collard-Wexler, 2006, 
p. 402). Despite the Neorealist claim that cooperation in the international system 
is extremely hard to achieve, the progressive institutionalization and deepened 
entanglement in the European Union seem to prove otherwise. 
 From a Neorealist perspective, it is extremely hard to explain why cooperation 
between the states of the European Union has not only being sustained, but even 
extended from „low politics‟, e.g. social and economic affairs, to „high politics‟, 
such as foreign policy (Collard-Wexler, 2006, p. 402). The inter-state cooperation 
of the European Union is indeed remarkable in the sense that over the past 
decades it has developed towards touching on the „core‟ areas that determine state 
security. Deriving from an economic alliance on coal and steel, the cooperation 
extended to other economic and financial areas up to recent efforts to establish an 
even closer union by formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
(Collard-Wexler, 2006). 
 
3.2.3 Supranationality versus Intergovernmentalism 
Two central concepts that play an important role in any discussion about the 
institutional framework of the European Union are supranationality and 
intergovernmentalism. In this context, a supranational institution is a body which 
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is located „above‟ sovereign states and can act without being dependent on the 
authorization of national governments. Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, 
describes the cooperation of governments without the authoritative participation 
of other actors (Wessels, 2008, p. 39). 
The institutional bodies of the European Union differ in terms of the extent to 
which they can be regarded as supranational or intergovernmental. The European 
Commission and the European Parliament, for instance, can be identified as the 
most supranational bodies of the European Union. The Council of Ministers and 
the European Council, on the other hand, are intergovernmental institutions 
which, despite an ongoing transfer of sovereign rights to the supranational bodies, 
still possess of great power in the decision-making processes of the European 
Union. Although the European Union has been subject to a steady process of 
integration and a transferring of power to its supranational institutions, the 
European Council is still regarded as the most powerful body in the European 
Union to date (Goebel, 2013, p. 123). 
However, even the fundamentally intergovernmental institution of the 
European Council has shown signs of progressive supranational functioning in its 
operation. The basis for this development set the Lisbon Treaty through which the 
possibility of qualified majority voting has been implemented in the decision-
making process of the European Council. The voting procedure of qualified 
majority is regarded as being a supranational characteristic as it leads to a 
situation in which individual member states may lose their right for final decisions 
(Wessels, 2008, p. 41). Because qualified majority voting does not require 
unanimity for decisions to be adopted, it may happen that a member state has to 
implement policies which it is strictly opposed to.  
 
As a result, apart from the Neorealist difficulties to explain the absence of anarchy 
and the lasting state cooperation within the European Union, its supranational 
system poses another difficulty to the theory. In general, Neorealists constitute 
that the transfer of a state‟s tasks and competencies to a superordinate institution 
are contrary to every state‟s goal of preserving its autonomy and thus security. It 
is not easy to explain from a Neorealist standpoint why the European states 
continue to follow a way of supranational integration instead of engaging in 
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purely intergovernmental cooperation, which in a Neorealist world is already hard 
to achieve. 
In order to try and explain the supranationality of the European Union, 
Neorealists argue that states may indeed choose to participate in supranational 
integration under certain circumstances. For instance, if states perceive that the 
potential disadvantage of not participating in a supranational institution would be 
higher than the security of maintaining their independence, they may choose to 
engage in supranational integration. This possibility gets more and more likely the 
larger and more powerful the group of states is which pushes forward the 
supranational institution (Gruber, 2000). 
Although this explanation may provide an answer to the question why states 
participate in supranational institutions in very distinct situations, there can be no 
doubt that a Neorealist would prefer an intergovernmental solution over a 
supranational approach (Collard-Wexler, 2006). 
 
 
3.3 Neorealist Predictions of the Eurozone‟s Crisis 
Management 
Now that it has been shown that the European Union poses an empirical example 
that is difficult to explain with Neorealism, the financial state power 
conceptualization given in the second chapter will be applied to the case of the 
Eurozone. Furthermore, it will be assessed how the theory of Neorealism would 
predict the design of the Eurozone‟s crisis management. Those theoretical 
predictions will then be used in the empirical part of the thesis to test whether in 
situations of severe crisis the states of the Eurozone disregard their institutional 
interconnectedness and fall back to Neorealist behavior. 
Having conceptualized financial state power as consisting of an offensive and a 
defensive component, there are distinct goals identifiable that Neorealism would 
expect a state to pursue.  
States in Neorealist theory are power maximizers. They constantly strive to 
maximize their power in relation to other states. In general, creditor states should 
be expected to maintain or even extend their relative creditor status by any means 
necessary. In regard to the defensive aspect of financial state power, states should 
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be expected to take any measures intended to increase their financial stability and 
to improve their ability to resist current or future threats to their defensive 
financial capabilities. 
However, having a state system like the European Union considerably prevents 
individual states from rigorously maximizing their financial power or to take 
actions regardless of their impact on other member states. The institutional 
framework of the European Union forces its member states to find solutions that 
are compatible with its institutional rules and circumstances. In short, the 
European Union defines the distinct framework conditions on which the states 
have to orient themselves. 
Furthermore, the monetary union of the Eurozone sets strict parameters of 
fiscal policies in which the member states can engage to preserve their financial 
security and economic well-being. Because of the area‟s financial and institutional 
entanglement, any measures intended to influence the currency of the Euro or to 
restore the financial markets‟ confidence in the currency area have direct 
repercussions for the rest of the Eurozone. As a result, the states are forced to take 
those repercussions into consideration if they want to prevent potential negative 
externalities for themselves. 
Bearing in mind the states‟ behavior in regard to financial power and taking 
into consideration the limitations of the European Union identified above, the 
theory of Neorealism can be used to identify specific strategies for the Eurozone‟s 
crisis management. 
 
3.3.1 Anarchy 
The first and most important prerequisite that has to be met for any predictions 
that utilize Neorealist theory is anarchy. If anarchy is not prevalent in the 
international system, Neorealism loses all of its explanatory power. The reason for 
this is that anarchy is needed to enable power play between the states. Only under 
anarchy, powerful states can coerce their will on weaker states, unimpaired by a 
superordinate authority. 
If it is already hard for Neorealism to explain why the member states of the 
European Union gather under a superior institution in times of peace, it seems to 
be even more exceptional that the states maintain such a behavior under crisis 
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conditions. In times of crises, when the states‟ survival is at threat, it is reasonable 
to assume that states would refrain from any binding, superior institutional 
framework and strive to establish a situation in which only the states themselves 
dispose of decision-making power. 
As a result, what should be expected from the state behavior in the face of the 
European debt crisis is that the counter-measures would be implemented not 
under the umbrella of the European Union but under the anarchy of the 
international system. 
 
3.3.2 Cooperation 
A similar line of thought also applies to any prediction about cooperation between 
the Eurozone states. Resulting from their primary interest, survival, states would 
be expected to act according to preserving this most important goal. This means 
that Neorealism would expect every state to take any measures that will, rationally 
seen, provide it with the highest chance of survival, respectively the maximization 
of its power. In reverse, states would not be expected to take any measures out of 
altruism or similar motives. Being only focused on their own well-being 
Neorealism expects states to readily cheat on other states if this would be the 
solution bearing the highest benefit for the acting state.  
As a result, state cooperation would only to be expected if the cooperating 
states would perceive the potential negative externalities resulting from non-
cooperation more severe than the risks that come with cooperation and the threat 
of being cheated.  
 
3.3.3 A Supranational or an Intergovernmental Solution? 
As has been shown before, the supranational way of European governance is 
something that Neorealism struggles to explain. The theory has no answer to the 
question why a state should voluntarily agree to the implementation of voting 
procedures that could potentially implement decisions against its own will.  
In a supranational framework, a state gives up, at least partially, his sovereign 
rights within certain policy areas. For instance, the European Union has a long 
tradition of taking a very active role in the implementation of new laws 
particularly in the fields of economic and trade policy, social policy, and transport 
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policy. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the legislation within those fields lies in the 
hands of the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. Those 
two institutions are able to pass European law independent of the preferences of 
individual member states. Since both bodies „only‟ need a qualified majority to 
pass the majority of law, in the worst case, European Union wide policies can be 
implemented against the will of an individual member state, despite potentially 
negative externalities such policies may have for said state. 
Consequently, the voluntary transfer of sovereign rights to a supranational 
institution like the European Union is a hard case for Neorealism to explain. Such 
a supranational framework should be expected not to be in the interest of any 
Neorealist thinking actor. Accordingly, the process of solution finding in response 
to the crisis should be expected to follow an intergovernmental, rather than a 
supranational path. 
 
 
3.4 Hypothesis 
The Neorealist predictions identified in the paragraphs above lead to the 
formulation of a hypothesis which the subsequent analysis will orientate itself 
towards. This hypothesis will be formulated in the following section. 
 
The European framework sets strict institutional rules which severely prohibit the 
member states from acting freely in following only their own interests. The 
transfer of sovereign rights to the supranational framework of the European Union 
prevents the power of decision-making from being fully in the hands of the 
member states. Especially in the area of economic and financial policy the 
European Union has a long history of very close interconnectedness and many 
policy areas have been given up to the administration of the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union.  
Following Neorealist assumptions, such a decision-making framework cannot 
be in the interest of the power-maximizing, rationally acting states. This should be 
even more relevant when crisis conditions threaten the financial security of a 
state. If the financial and economic well-being of a state is suddenly at risk to such 
an extent that it threatens the whole foundation of its financial security and 
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financial power, it should be expected that states refrain from any attempts to take 
actions intended to promote a structure which takes away the decision-making 
power from them. It should be expected that in times of crisis the European Union 
would be of secondary importance to the states and that they return to a behavior 
aimed at protect the own well-being. In case that cooperation is needed in order to 
maintain their security, states would be expected to engage in an 
intergovernmental approach to solution finding instead of engaging in deeper 
supranational integration.  
 
My hypothesis is thus that in crisis situations states can be observed to fall back 
into Neorealist behavior even in such an institutionalized state union as the 
European Union. 
In order to find evidence for this hypothesis, it has to be shown that the 
member states of the Eurozone have acted according to Neorealist predictions 
during the implementation of the counter-measures to the European debt crisis. 
Those predictions have been made in the section above concerning three main 
criteria: anarchy, cooperation and supranationality. It is those three criteria which 
have to be fulfilled in order to provide evidence for the hypothesis. As a result, it 
shall be shown that the three most important counter-measures to the European 
debt crisis were, firstly, negotiated under anarchy. Secondly, that the cooperation 
leading to the implementation of the counter-measures reflected the financial 
power relations among the Eurozone states and, thirdly, that the institutional 
design of the measures was intergovernmental instead of a supranational. The 
qualitative part of this thesis will thus be structured according to those three 
criteria. 
Before the empirical analysis will be conducted, the research strategy and the 
underlying methodology will be presented in the next chapter. 
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4 Research Strategy and Methodology 
In order to find evidence that supports the aforementioned hypothesis, a 
methodological framework will be designed in the following chapter that is 
suitable for the specific purpose of this thesis‟ analysis. The methodology is based 
on a mixed-methods approach combining quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
The aim of the quantitative research is to descriptively explore the power relations 
in the Eurozone in the years of the European debt crisis. It shall provide a ranking 
of states according to their financial power in both offensive and defensive terms. 
The qualitative analysis then strives to find evidence for the hypothesis that states 
fell back into Neorealist behavior in the specific situation of the European debt 
crisis. Qualitative evidence shall be found by exploring the three most important 
counter-measures taken to counter the European debt crisis. 
 
 
4.1 The Case Study Research Strategy 
The research strategy that will be applied in this study is a comparative case study 
design. A comparative case study design has been chosen because of its particular 
suitability to discover contrasts, similarities or patterns with the goal of 
developing theory (Campbell, 2010, p. 174). Since the goal of this thesis is to 
extend the application of Neorealist theory to the case of the Eurozone by 
generating an in-depth, contextual understanding of the events during the 
European debt crisis, the comparative case study design suits this purpose. 
Accordingly, the specific case at hand is the crisis management of the member 
states of the Eurozone in the course of the European debt crisis. The reason for 
choosing the crisis management of the Eurozone as a single case, and not the 
individual behavior of the member states as multiple cases is that the focus of the 
study lies rather on the overall composition of the implementation processes than 
on a close examination of every single state‟s behavior. 
As the case under investigation is a single case, not multiple cases, the 
following exploration corresponds to a within-case analysis which is the “in-depth 
exploration of a single case as a standalone entity” (Paterson, 2010, p. 970). 
Within this single case, however, multiple organizational entities might be 
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explored. For instance, a within-case study might contain the negotiations 
between several allies or the behavior of multiple organizations in a certain 
industry (Campbell, 2010, p. 174f.). As Barbara L. Paterson puts it, within-case 
studies involve  
an intimate familiarity with a particular case in order to discern how the processes or patterns 
that are revealed in that case support, refute, or expand (a) a theory that the researcher has 
selected or (b) the propositions that the researcher has derived from a review of the literature 
and/or experience with the phenomenon under study. (Paterson, 2010, p. 970f.) 
In the case of this thesis‟ particular case study design, propositions derived from a 
quantitative analysis of chosen financial indicators in the Eurozone will be tested 
against qualitatively raised data concerning international policy making in order to 
expand the application of theory of Neorealism. It thus comprises both purposes 
of a within-case analysis as identified by Paterson. 
Typically, within-case analyses begin with a rich descriptive part which 
provides a profound and deep understanding of the context and individual 
characteristics of the analyzed case (Paterson, 2010, p. 972). This first descriptive 
part of the analysis aims to set the basis for following conclusions to be drawn. 
Correspondingly, in this thesis, the quantitative part sets the basis for theoretical 
predictions that will be subject to the subsequent qualitative analysis. 
 
 
4.2 Case Selection 
The case that was chosen for this comparative case study is the Eurozone in the 
course of the European debt crisis between the years 2009 and 2014. This specific 
period was chosen to illustrate how the crisis management developed from the 
start of the European Debt crisis in 2009 over the implementation of counter-
measures between 2010 and 2012 until 2014 when possible effects of the 
Eurozone‟s crisis management could be observed. While the severity of the crisis 
and its immense effects on the socio-economic landscape of the European Union 
make this case worthwhile to explore, there are several more reasons for choosing 
this case while simultaneously justifying the choice of the Eurozone as the 
analytical object of this thesis.  
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First of all, there is the anomaly which the European Union, and thus the 
Eurozone as well, poses to Neorealism. In order to develop theory and enhancing 
its explanatory area, it is necessary to deal with special cases that put the theory to 
a test. For this purpose, the unusualness of the Eurozone offers a rich case to 
explore. Choosing the Eurozone as the analytical object of this thesis furthermore 
contributes to the knowledge about this regionally as well as globally important 
structure and may thus produce knowledge transferable onto other fields.  
Apart from the potential theoretical benefits, the case selection may also 
contribute to the understanding and development of future ways to tackle similar 
crises. The European debt crisis has had severe economic, political, and social 
repercussions all over Europe and the rest of the world. Thus, exploring the 
underlying mechanisms that steered the responses to the crisis helps to further 
expand the knowledge about the case at hand and can potentially help by 
identifying new aspects to consider for future policy-making. 
Lastly, the case selection has some very practical advantages. Choosing the 
Eurozone as the case for this study offers a rich set of benefits concerning 
comparability. The area‟s strong financial entanglement particularly increases the 
quality and richness of the available data about financial statuses, enhances the 
comparability due to the share of the same currency, and provides a comparatively 
solid documentation of the measures taken in the framework of the financial 
crisis. Achieving a high comparability is seen as the main force behind case 
selection for comparative case studies (Yanow, Schwartz-Shea, & José Freitas, 
2010, p. 111) and thus further supports the choice of taking the Eurozone as the 
case for this thesis. Moreover, the case selection overcomes potential pitfalls of 
the comparative framework by sharing the same years of comparison, the 
organizational framework, and the political context (cf. Campbell, 2010). This 
makes the potential findings of the study more robust towards critique concerning 
the comparability of objects analyzed here.  
To sum it up, the case selection offers advantages for both theoretical and 
practical considerations. While the unusualness of the Eurozone to Neorealism 
bears the chance to expand the theory in this direction, the size and global 
importance of the Eurozone makes it a promising case to explore regarding the 
handling of the financial crisis. Furthermore, the interconnectedness of the area 
enhances the basis of available data and improves the comparability. Although the 
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thesis may benefit from those particularities, however, there naturally are certain 
limitations and potential biases to be borne in mind. 
  
 
4.3 Limitations and Potential Biases 
Just like any other research, this work is subject to certain limitations and 
potential biases that may weaken the expressiveness of the analysis. In order to 
relate the limitations to the respective issue they apply to, each section of this 
thesis that deals with methodology has its own sub-chapter in which those 
concerns will be tackled. Accordingly, the following paragraph only deals with 
the limitations of the chosen case study design. 
One particular point worthy of discussion is the choice of regarding the crisis 
management of the Eurozone during the European debt crisis as a single case and 
not multiple cases. The main reason for choosing a one-case design is that the 
focus of the study lies on the Eurozone‟s joint crisis management which 
influenced all member states of the Eurozone the same. Furthermore, although the 
Eurozone will be regarded as one case, it is multiple differences which will be 
looked at within the framework of this specific case. Since different entities will 
be compared within the case, the case study design should be rather regarded as a 
single-case design that puts the focus on its internal differences and comparison. 
Naturally, an alternative research design could have taken the individual member 
states of the Eurozone as multiple cases and then compare those different cases 
with each other. In contrast to a single-case design, however, such a solution was 
felt to lose the specific focus on the Eurozone as a distinct entity. The focus of this 
study is thus on the specific construct of the European community rather than 
looking at its multiple member states as the central object of interest. Since 
everything which will be analyzed in this thesis is seen in the context of the 
distinct Eurozone environment, the choice has been made to regard the crisis 
management of the Eurozone during the European debt crisis as one single case 
under consideration. 
 
Now that the overarching research strategy has been defined, the basis has been 
set for the first analysis of this thesis‟ mixed-methods approach. In the following 
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chapter, the quantitative analysis will be conducted. The chapter starts by 
describing the applied methodological framework and the methods of data 
collection. Subsequently, the empirical analysis will be carried out with the goal 
of exploring the power relations in the Eurozone during the European debt crisis. 
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5 Quantitative Analysis 
Resting upon the conceptualization of financial state power given in the second 
chapter, the financial power distribution in the Eurozone will be descriptively 
analyzed in the following chapter. This analysis will then serve as the basis for the 
qualitative analysis which will be carried out later. 
 
 
5.1 Quantitative Research Design and Method 
The quantitative part of this thesis consists of a time-series comparison. The 
underlying research question is “How was financial state power distributed 
among the states of the Eurozone between 2009 and 2014?”. In order to assess the 
financial power distribution in the Eurozone, the thesis builds on two main 
indicators which are investigated empirically. Those two indicators are: 
1. The creditor distribution within the Eurozone as a determinant of financial 
influence (offensive financial state power) 
2. The financial (in-)stability of the Eurozone states as a determinant of 
resistance against financial crises or similar harming financial influences 
(defensive financial state power) 
The two indicators will be the object of a time-series analysis based on official 
data published by Eurostat and the European Central Bank. The first indicator will 
be examined using data from Eurostat. The analysis of the second indicator will 
be based on the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress published by the 
European Central Bank. 
In order to enable a statement about the financial power relations within the 
Eurozone during the crisis data for a time period starting with the first year of the 
European debt crisis in 2009 until the year 2014 will be analyzed.  
The sample of states that will be included into the analysis consists of 16 states 
which represent the 2009 composition of the “Eurozone”; the group of states 
sharing the common currency of the Euro. The sample purposely disregards states 
which have become members of the Eurozone after 2009. This decision has been 
made because the goal of the comparative study is to draw a concise picture of the 
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financial state power distribution between 2009 and 2014. In order to avoid 
changes in the sample between the individual years, the same set of states will be 
kept for all years of the analysis. Hence, the 16 states included in the sample are 
(in alphabetical order): Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, and Portugal. 
 
In the course of developing the research design for this thesis, other than the 
mentioned two indicators have been taken into consideration but were dismissed 
due to various reasons. Among others, it had been thought investigate the size of 
the financial sectors in the individual states as an indicator of the influence certain 
states have on the financial system. Another possible approach was to incorporate 
the amount of foreign exchange reserves that the member states of the Eurozone 
hold as an indicator of influence on the international currency system. While the 
former was dismissed due to the assumed weak link between the size of financial 
sectors and financial state power, the latter was eventually disregarded because 
the monetary union status of the Eurozone prevents the indicator from having an 
influence of financial state power. Another indicator that could have been 
analyzed was the individual credit ratings of the Eurozone states as a determinant 
of financial leeway. It was dismissed because it could not be brought into 
conformity with the concepts of financial state power used in this thesis. 
In the end, the two indicators proposed above seemed to promise the most 
valuable and solid basis for the research design. Nevertheless, other indicators 
could as well have been chosen. 
 
5.1.1 Operationalization 
The following paragraphs transform the concept of financial state power into the 
two chosen indicators. Subsequently, the indicators will be related to numeric 
variables in order to enable a statistical analysis. 
  
The first indicator is the creditor distribution within the Eurozone. This indicator 
represents what Susan Strange understands as a possibility to influence financial 
structures. The ability to provide loans to other states bears a significant source of 
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financial state power. A creditor in the international system gets to decide on the 
terms of the credit, for it can influence these terms according to its own 
preferences and strategic goals. Being a creditor in the financial system thus 
affects a state‟s ability to cause another state to do something that it would 
otherwise not do. This is due to the condition that the debt structure in a given 
international structure is generally subject to terms dictated by the creditor states 
of that system. Creditor status thus has an effect on the offensive understanding of 
financial state power. Providing credit can transform into political influence 
which in turn may strengthen a state‟s ability to cause another state what it would 
otherwise not do. 
Despite the financial power that a creditor position certainly grants, it is 
important to note that creditor-debtor relationships are not necessarily a zero sum 
game. Indeed, in some cases the welfare of the creditor depends on the welfare of 
the debtor. As a result, creditor states cannot always simply decide to stop 
granting credit to another state without also potentially weaken their own 
economy. This phenomenon is highly affected by the extent to which the 
economy of the creditor state is dependent on the credit granted to the debtor 
state. Although it can be stated that a creditor-debtor relation is generally more 
beneficial for the creditor state in terms of financial power, potential negative 
externalities for the creditor state should not be overlooked. 
 
In order to enable a statistical analysis of the indicator, the creditor distribution 
has to be related to a numeric variable suitable for a statistical analysis. For this 
reason, data on intergovernmental lending within the Eurozone will be used as the 
empirical basis of the first indicator.  
Intergovernmental loans are credits that a government grants another 
government and can be regarded as being a measure for crisis situations when the 
regular channels of states to fund their expenses (e.g. through government bonds) 
break down. The reason that intergovernmental loans are mainly a measure for 
crisis situations is that they place states in a situation of dependence on other 
states, which is generally not in any state‟s interest, especially if it has other 
alternatives (Helleiner, 2014). 
The data on intergovernmental lending used in the upcoming analysis covers 
government loan assets with other EU governments as counterparties. It thus 
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represents a valid indicator to measure the creditor status of countries in the 
distinct context of the European Union. The data can be filtered to cover only the 
states of the Eurozone which then provides the possibility to view this space as the 
discreet object of analysis. 
 
The second indicator analyzed in this thesis is the financial stability of the 
Eurozone states. Financial stability can be defined as the ability to resist financial 
stress (Holló, Kremer, & Lo Duca, 2012). Thus, it relates to financial power in the 
way that a lower financial stability generally induces a higher vulnerability to 
external shocks such as financial crises or other occurrences that could potentially 
harm the domestic financial system. Financial stability thus influences the 
defensive understanding of financial state power by determining the resistance of 
a state against financial crises or similar harming financial influences. 
The numerical variable which will be used for the analysis of the financial 
stability within the Eurozone is based on data derived from the Composite 
Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS). The CISS was composed and published by 
the European Central Bank and “measures the current state of instability, i.e. the 
current level of frictions, stresses and strains (or the absence of these) in the 
financial system” (Holló, Kremer, & Lo Duca, 2012, p. 2) of a state. It consists of 
five sub-indices covering the current level of stress in the following segments of 
the financial sector: bank and non-bank financial intermediaries, money markets, 
securities (equities and bonds) markets as well as foreign exchange markets 
(Holló, Kremer, & Lo Duca, 2012). 
In the design of the CISS, the level of „financial stress‟, which is measured by 
the composite indicator, is equaled with the current instability of a state‟s 
financial system as a whole (Holló, Kremer, & Lo Duca, 2012, p. 8). It is thus an 
ex-post assessment of financial instability. The composite concept of financial 
instability used as the basis for the calculation of the CISS is based on several 
different symptoms that are associated in academic literature with financial 
(in)stability. Those are an increase in financial market uncertainty, an increase in 
disagreement among investors, an increase in the asymmetry of information 
between borrowers and lenders, and a reduced preference for holding risky assets 
and/or illiquid assets (Holló, Kremer, & Lo Duca, 2012, p. 9).  
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It is reasonable to assume that the two indicators show certain interdependencies 
and connections with each other. The CISS, as a highly aggregated indicator, 
takes into consideration a lot of different sub-indices some of which may have 
points of contact with spheres that also influence the intergovernmental lending 
procedures. 
In fact, there is a distinct interdependency between the first and the second 
indicator that should be mentioned here. As described during the 
operationalization of the first indicator, intergovernmental credits are a means 
which comes into practice when regular forms of borrowing money are failing. 
They can be regarded as the last resort when private investors have lost 
confidence in a state and refuse to engage in granting it more credit. In contrast, 
an unstable financial system is certainly a factor that influences the decision not to 
trust in the ability of a state to pay back its debt. Because the CISS only measures 
the current level of systemic instability, however, it does not make any 
predictions on how this stability will develop. It thus encompasses only a part of 
the relevant data included in the decision-making on granting credit.  
In order to answer the question if the two indicators analyzed here are directly 
influencing each other, the correlation between the two variables has been 
measured. With a correlation coefficient between the total amount of 
intergovernmental lending and the overall financial instability of the Eurozone of 
about -0.58, the two variables indeed show a moderate negative relationship.  
 
5.1.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The empirical material used to analyze the first indicator consists of primary 
statistical sources obtained from Eurostat, the statistical office of the European 
Union. The data was collected from the official homepage of Eurostat. It is part of 
the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) data which is collected by Eurostat on a 
regular basis. 
As a reaction to the Eurozone crisis, Eurostat started collecting data on 
intergovernmental lending in 2010. The questionnaire of this data “covers 
quarterly data on stocks of loans related to claims of other EU Member States” 
(Eurostat, 2011, p. 3). Any amounts related to the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) were initially not included in the data and were collected 
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separately. From 2011 onwards, however, credit granted by the EFSF has been 
included in the statistics on intergovernmental lending (Eurostat, 2012). 
The data on intergovernmental lending (IGL) covers government loan assets 
with other EU governments as counterparties. The processed data shows who the 
largest creditors in the Eurozone are. In relation to the total intergovernmental 
lending volume, the data shows who provides the highest share of 
intergovernmental loans in the Eurozone and thus portrays which country disposes 
of the largest capabilities to influence the creditor structures within the Eurozone. 
 
The data for the second indicator originates from the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and was collected from its official homepage. The Composite Indicator of 
Systemic Stress dataset is part of the ECB‟s series on monetary and financial 
statistics and is available on a monthly basis for a certain set of countries. The 
value range of the CISS ranges from 0 to 1 with values which tend towards 0 
representing high financial stability and 1 representing high financial instability 
(Holló, Kremer, & Lo Duca, 2012). 
The processed data then shows what countries are financially unstable and how 
the member states financial stability has changed over time.  
 
The data analysis will rely on descriptive statistical methods in order to present an 
assessment of the distribution of intergovernmental credit and financial stability in 
the Eurozone. For the first indicator, the respective shares of the individual 
member states in the total amount of intergovernmental lending in the Eurozone 
will be calculated in order to enable a comparison between the individual member 
states. Because the second indicator is based on an index calculating the share of 
each country is not practical. Instead, the individual values are compared directly.  
With the goal of providing a descriptive overview of the relationships, several 
graphs and figures will be presented that show the main features of the data 
collection. Subsequently, anomalies and specific characteristics of the data will be 
presented. In order to show whether the distribution of intergovernmental loans is 
highly unequal or equal, a variance analysis assessing the standard coefficient of 
variation will be conducted. The data was processed and prepared using the 
spreadsheet application Microsoft Excel. 
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5.1.3 Limitations and Potential Biases 
One limitation that has to be dealt with concerns the operationalization of 
financial state power. It is not being claimed that the two indicators analyzed in 
this thesis are the only indicators to measure financial power. However, over the 
course of the creation of this work, the two indicators have been repeatedly 
questioned and tested for their suitability. The result is that the analysis of these 
indicators should be seen as a contribution to the overall knowledge of the 
concept and measurement of financial state power rather than a claim for being 
the only way to approach such a measurement. 
Another point worthy of discussion is the choice of analyzing lending instead 
of borrowing. The reason for this is that lending was regarded as relating closer to 
offensive financial state power than borrowing. Moreover, the indicator of 
financial instability essentially identifies borrowing countries as their financial 
instability index increases the more they borrow. It is also more comprehensive 
than just analyzing borrowing figures since it also includes information about 
countries whose borrowing share would be zero. 
Furthermore, the data used for the analysis has some limitations in itself. This 
is especially the case for the second indicator, financial stability, which is 
unfortunately not available for all member states of the Eurozone. It covers only 
11 out of the 16 states to be analyzed. The missing states are (in alphabetical 
order): Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Although there is a 
number of missing states for this indicator, the decision has been made to include 
it nonetheless. The reason behind this is that financial (in)stability is regarded as 
being so critical to defensive financial state power that its analysis is still 
considered as adding a lot of valuable insight and explanatory power, despite its 
possible limitations. 
Finally, the choice of leaving out states which became members of the 
Eurozone after 2009 naturally diminishes the expressiveness of the results in a 
certain way. When interpreting the conclusions which will be drawn in the 
analysis, it always has to be borne in mind that the analysis does not consider the 
financial power of the countries that joined the Eurozone after 2009.  
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5.2 Creditor Status 
In the following subchapter, creditor status as an indicator of offensive financial 
state power will be analyzed. For a first overview, the following figure shows how 
the absolute amounts of intergovernmental lending have developed from 2009 to 
2014. Subsequently, those absolute amounts will be put in context by calculating 
every individual country‟s share in the total sum of intergovernmental loans.  
 
Figure 1: Development of absolute amounts of intergovernmental lending in the Eurozone  
 
The above figure indicates that there has been a continuous increase with a rapid 
growth from 2011 to 2012. The upswing in 2011 is related to a heavy increase in 
lending to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Furthermore, the figures from 2011 
onwards include loans made by the European Financial Stability Facility 
(Eurostat, 2012). The total amount of credit granted increased from 0.7 billion 
Euros in 2009, over 6.9 billion Euros in 2011 to 240 billion Euros in 2014. At the 
end of the third quarter of 2014, the share of intergovernmental lending in the 
gross domestic product of the Eurozone equaled 2.4 percent (Eurostat, 2015). 
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Apart from the development of the absolute amounts of intergovernmental loans, 
it is of interest which shares the individual members of the Eurozone hold in the 
total amount of intergovernmental lending and whether those relative figures have 
changed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Figure 2: Share of intergovernmental loans in the Eurozone from 2009 to 2014 
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Figure 2 shows the shares of total intergovernmental loans in the Eurozone from 
2009 to 2014. In 2009, the only states engaging in intergovernmental lending were 
Belgium and Germany. From 2010, however, the other member states started to 
contribute to the intergovernmental lending in the Eurozone as well, with the 
exception of Greece. For Slovakia, which entered the Eurozone in 2009, 
intergovernmental lending has been reported from 2011 onwards.  
Germany has been the largest creditor state throughout all the years under 
investigation which, since 2010, is followed by France (second), Italy (third), and 
Spain (fourth largest creditor state). In 2014, those four countries together were 
responsible for 82.6 percent of the Eurozone‟s total intergovernmental lending 
capacity. 
Induced by its central role in the European debt crisis and therefore receiving 
the majority of the credit granted, Greece has not been contributing to the 
intergovernmental lending capacity in the Eurozone. Having to use 
intergovernmental support themselves, Portugal‟s and Ireland‟s share of 
intergovernmental loans has been subject to a comparatively sharp decrease from 
2010 (2.6 and 1.6 percent) to 2014 (0.5 and 0.1 percent). Holding roughly the 
same share as those two countries, Slovakia (0.8%), Slovenia (0.5%), 
Luxembourg (0.3%), Cyprus (0.2%), and Malta (0.1%) are completing the set of 
countries with the lowest share of intergovernmental lending in the Eurozone. 
One of the key findings apparent in figure 2 is that the share of 
intergovernmental loans stayed roughly unaltered between the years 2010 and 
2014. Although the absolute amounts of intergovernmental credit have increased, 
the share between the Eurozone countries has not changed much. The reason for 
that is that the contribution rates of the individual Eurozone states were based on 
the equity interest each state holds in the capital of the European Central Bank 
(European Commission, 2010, p. 26). Those rates are recalculated every five 
years and are based on the population and the economic output of a country. The 
small adjustments in individual shares that can be observed mainly between 2010 
and 2012 can be explained by the exit of Greece, Portugal, and Ireland from the 
rescue programs, such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), 
because of the countries‟ own financial trouble during these years. Apart from the 
visual impression, this finding is backed by the standardized coefficient of 
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variation which stays approximately the same for the years 2011 until 2014 (0.34 
to 0.40). 
The analysis of the intergovernmental lending capacities in the Eurozone has 
revealed that the creditor distribution in the Eurozone has stayed roughly the same 
since 2010, resulting in relatively consistent offensive financial power relations. 
Germany, holding the largest share of intergovernmental lending can then be 
identified as the most powerful country in terms of offensive financial power, 
followed by France, Italy, and Spain.  
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5.3 Financial (In)Stability 
The following subchapter analyzes financial (in)stability as an indicator of 
defensive financial state power. Figure 3 provides an overview about the 
development of each state‟s financial instability from 2009 and 2014. Following 
this, the individual member states will be ranked in comparison to the other 
Eurozone states in order to show which countries were the comparatively most 
stable, respectively unstable. 
 
Figure 3: Development of financial instability in the Eurozone from 2009 to 2014  
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Figure 3 shows that the financial instability of the Eurozone states has been 
subject to partly heavy fluctuations. Not only Greece, Portugal, and Ireland but 
also Spain, Italy, and Belgium experienced sharp increases in financial instability 
starting with the beginning of the European debt crisis at the end of 2009. After a 
phase of generally increased financial instability in the Eurozone between 2010 
and 2012, state financial systems started to become more stable again from 2012 
onwards. An exception is Greece which, although becoming initially more stable, 
experienced another increase in its financial instability since the beginning of 
2014. As a result, the financial instability of Greece is still many times larger 
compared to the other Eurozone states. 
It can be constituted that all of the Eurozone members suffered from a 
decreased defensive financial state power between 2010 and 2012 as a result of a 
generally increased financial instability. The extent to which the countries have 
been affected, however, differed rather significantly. While some states like 
Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, and France maintained relative financial 
stability during those years, other states, like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy 
experienced a sharp increase in financial instability. 
The individual rankings of every single state in relation to the other member 
states of the Eurozone become even clearer in the following table.  
 
Table 1: State-rankings of financial stability from 2009 to 2015 
            Year 
 
State 
01.2009 01.2010 01.2011 01.2012 01.2013 01.2014 01.2015 
Austria 6 (-) 6 (-) 5 (↑) 5 (-) 4 (↑) 4 (-) 1 (↑) 
Belgium 1 (-) 3 (↓) 6 (↓) 6 (-) 5 (↑) 6 (↓) 4 (↑) 
Germany 3 (-) 1 (↑) 1 (-) 1 (-) 1 (-) 2 (↓) 6 (↓) 
Spain 8 (-) 8 (-) 8 (-) 8 (-) 8 (-) 9 (↓) 8 (↑) 
Finland 4 (-) 4 (-) 4 (-) 2 (↑) 3 (↓) 1 (↑) 5 (↓) 
France 7 (-) 2 (↑) 2 (-) 4 (↓) 6 (↓) 5 (↑) 2 (↑) 
Greece 11 (-) 11 (-) 11 (-) 11 (-) 11 (-) 11 (-) 11 (-) 
Ireland 10 (-) 10 (-) 10 (-) 7 (↑) 7 (-) 7 (-) 3 (↑) 
Italy 5 (-) 9 (↓) 7 (↑) 9 (↓) 9 (-) 8 (↑) 9 (↓) 
Netherlands 9 (-) 5 (↑) 3 (↑) 3 (-) 2 (↑) 3 (↓) 7 (↓) 
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Portugal 2 (-) 7 (↓) 9 (↓) 10 (↓) 10 (-) 10 (-) 10 (-) 
Note: A lower number represents a higher financial stability. 
(-): no change compared to the previous year 
(↑): improved ranking compared to the previous year 
(↓): lower ranking compared to the previous year 
Source: European Central Bank; author's representation 
As can be seen in table 1, the member states of the Eurozone experienced 
significantly different developments concerning their financial stability. Ireland, 
for instance, although having had a very unstable financial system from 2009 to 
2011, ranked among the countries with the highest financial stability as of 2015. 
Portugal, on the other hand, has developed from one of the financially most stable 
countries in 2009 to the country with the second highest financial instability since 
2012. Belgium and Italy have also experienced a reduction of their financial 
stability while Finland and the Netherlands were able to improve their financial 
stability until 2014, followed by a drop until 2015.  
Furthermore, what can be observed is that Greece was the country with the 
lowest financial stability throughout all the years under consideration. 
Consistently among the financially most stable countries has been Germany, 
although its financial system became more unstable in 2014.  
Of particular interest for this thesis are the years from 2010 until 2012, when 
important counter-measures to the crisis have been implemented. Table 1 shows 
that the countries with the highest financial stability during that time were 
Germany and France, followed by Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Austria. All in all, the findings above indicate that Germany can be regarded as 
the country with the most defensive financial state power during the first years of 
the European debt crisis with Greece representing the weakest country in this 
regard.   
 
 
5.4 Comparing Both Indicators 
In order to express the differences between the Eurozone states even more and to 
prepare the data for the upcoming theoretical assessment, the following figure 
shows the relative position of the Eurozone states compared to each other and 
according to their performance on the two indicators. 
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Figure 4: Financial state power distribution in the Eurozone in the years 2010 and 2014 
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What becomes apparent when comparing both, creditor status, as an indicator for 
offensive, and financial instability, as an indicator for defensive financial state 
power is that Germany, followed by France, were the overall most financially 
powerful states of the Eurozone during the European debt crisis. Both countries 
score very well on both the offensive and the defensive indicator of financial 
power. Apart from that, it can be seen that Italy, although having had a high share 
of total intergovernmental lending and thus offensive financial state power, 
suffered from a rather high financial instability which prevented the country from 
taking a place beside Germany and France in 2010. By 2014, however, Italy was 
able to reduce its financial instability and thus joined Germany and France in the 
group of the financially most powerful states of the Eurozone. 
Furthermore, it can be constituted that, all in all, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal 
have been the three countries which were the least financially powerful states in 
2010. This is valid for both the offensive and the defensive understanding of 
financial power as those countries perform badly on both of the indicators. Spain, 
although contributing a significant share of intergovernmental lending, was 
financially very unstable and thus included in the group of the least powerful 
states. Spain, as well as Ireland, and Portugal, however, were able to regain 
defensive financial power until 2014, leaving Greece as the only country with a 
lack of power in both the offensive and defensive category.  
What can be seen apart from those individual findings is that, except for 
Greece, the financial systems of the Eurozone states became generally more stable 
from 2010 to 2014 while the countries‟ shares of intergovernmental lending 
stayed roughly the same. 
 
 
5.5 Interpreting the Financial Power Distribution in 
the Eurozone 
The comparative analysis of the two indicators revealed how the financial power 
relations in the Eurozone were shaped between 2009 and 2014. The question now 
to be asked is how Neorealism would make sense of the Eurozone‟s financial 
power relationships. In the ideal-typical anarchical international system of 
Neorealism, the stronger states would be expected to impose their will on the 
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weaker states. Since there is no supervising institution, the rules of power politics 
would enable that powerful states coerce others or impose their will on them. 
Naturally, this predictions stands in sharp contrast to the institutional environment 
of the European Union and the state-dominated Council of the European Union in 
which, on paper, all states are equal and have equal voting rights. 
What the empirical analysis of the first indicator, offensive financial state 
power, revealed is that there is a small number of states which hold about 82.6 
percent of the total intergovernmental lending capacity of the Eurozone. Those 
four states, namely Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, thus dispose of significant 
abilities to influence the financial power structures of the Eurozone. This small 
group of states, however, shrinks even further when the second indicator, 
defensive financial state power, comes into play. Because the financial stability of 
Italy, and especially Spain was comparatively low, their overall financial power 
position was diminished. As a result, Germany and France were the only two 
states that were powerful in both the offensive and the defensive category of 
financial power.  
Although the European financial power relations are thus dominated by those 
two states, none of them are able to obtain a hegemonic position. As a result, 
though the financial power structures show a significant imbalance towards those 
two powerful states, presumably none of them is able to dominate the financial 
structures on their own. Thus, in order to push through their interests, even 
Germany as well as France would have to seek a partner for cooperation, 
preferably another powerful states in order to minimize the number of actors 
whose interests would have to be taken into consideration. 
In short, what Neorealists would expect is that the financially powerful states 
of the Eurozone, with especially Germany leading the way, would impose their 
will on the weaker Eurozone states, like Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. In case this 
was not possible for one state alone, this state would be expected to search for a 
powerful state to cooperate in order to push through its interests.  
 Judging from the empirical analysis, the most powerful cooperation of states 
would be between Germany and France, for those countries holding together just 
over 50 percent of the overall contributions to the Eurozone‟s intergovernmental 
lending capacity and having comparatively high financial stability. 
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Again, however, it has to be noted that all these predictions of Neorealism can 
only be met if the prerequisite of anarchy is prevalent. If this is not the case, 
Neorealism loses its explanatory power. 
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6 Qualitative Analysis 
In the following chapter, the qualitative analysis will be conducted. In order to set 
the methodological basis for the analysis, the chapter starts with the description of 
the qualitative research design and the method to be applied. Following this, there 
will be a short sub-chapter dealing with the prerequisites for international 
cooperation. Finally, the qualitative evidence will be presented and conclusively 
analyzed. 
 
 
6.1 Qualitative Research Design and Method 
Especially for mixed-methods studies, document analysis represents a valuable 
method to complement and expand data derived through another (quantitative) 
method (Bowen, 2009). In the case of this study, document analysis will be used 
to answer the second research question: ”Can the fiscal counter-measures taken 
in the course of the European debt crisis be explained by the theory of 
Neorealism?” which partly draws on the results of the quantitative analysis. The 
aim of the qualitative part of this thesis is thus to find evidence for the hypothesis 
that the three arguably most important measures implemented in the course of the 
European debt crisis can be explained by the theory of Neorealism.  
 
Document analysis as a research method is particularly useful for case studies as 
“documents of all types can help the researcher uncover meaning, develop 
understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem” (Merriam, 
1988, p. 118). It may furthermore be the only viable method to research historical 
events as documents may then be the only source of data obtainable for the 
researcher (Bowen, 2009, p. 29). Documents, such as protocols, drafts of treaties, 
reports or similar evidence, can provide historical insight and can help the 
researcher to make sense of the roots of specific historical events as well as 
explore the conditions that triggered a certain phenomenon (Bowen, 2009, p. 29). 
Particularly drafts from certain stages of a process can be used to track change and 
development of this respective process. Naturally, relying on documents issued by 
third parties always bears the risk that these documents may be influenced heavily 
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by the respective preferences of the issuing actor. Thus, when using documents to 
conduct research one has to be aware of the source of the documents and the 
potential implications this might entail. Closely related to this remark is one of the 
disadvantages of document analysis: insufficient detail. Because documents are 
produced to fit another purpose than research, they might not provide all the 
information in sufficient detail for the purpose of the study (Bowen, 2009, p. 
31f.). Finally, an important question to be asked is how many documents should 
be included in a document analysis in order to be scientifically sound. Glenn A. 
Bowen (2009) responds to this question by making the remark that the researcher 
should be less concerned about the quantity of the documents to be analyzed than 
the quality they can provide regarding the finding of an answer to the research 
question (ibid., 33). 
In some cases, previous studies can be a useful source of data if the raw data 
analyzed in the respective study is not available to the researcher (Bowen, 2009, 
p. 28). This can be especially the case for historical research as certain sources 
may be unobtainable (Bowen, 2009, p. 29). 
 
6.1.1 Data Analysis 
In order to find evidence for the hypothesis that international policy making in the 
Eurozone can be explained by Neorealism, the three arguably most important 
counter-measures to the European debt crisis will be analyzed. Those are the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) from 2010, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) from 2012, and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, known as Fiscal Compact, 
from 2012. While the first two measures were implemented to provide financial 
assistance to Eurozone states in need of help, the Fiscal Compact is an 
international treaty aimed at preventing crises such as the European debt crisis 
from ever happen again. 
In the course of battling the effects of the crisis, particularly the EFSF and later 
the ESM were designed to bring back stability to the troubled financial markets 
which had lost confidence in some of the badly hit Eurozone states. They were the 
biggest and most important counter-measures that had been taken during the 
European debt crisis (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013) and thus constitute suitable 
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instances to explore in order to find evidence for the argument that the Eurozone‟s 
crisis management is congruent with Neorealist predictions. The Fiscal Compact, 
on the other hand, is less a rescue mechanism than a safety measure to prevent 
excessive debt levels in the future. As such it completes the path taken during the 
European debt crisis and presents the third important measure worthwhile to 
explore. 
Because the negotiations for the three counter-measures are historical events 
that can no longer be observed, relying on reports and analyses documenting the 
process of the negotiations is seen to be the most reliable method to gather data on 
those events. Furthermore, to gain even deeper insight into the processes 
accompanying the negotiations, a number of chosen studies conducted on the 
three measures will be analyzed. 
 
6.1.2 Data Collection and Interpretation 
The empirical material used for the qualitative part of this thesis comprises 
primary as well as secondary sources consisting of legal documents as well as 
studies conducted on the phenomena under investigation. The data was collected 
from the official homepages of the investigated bodies and from common sources 
of academic literature. The following table shows the documents that were 
analyzed and the specific data which was drawn from them. 
 
Table 2: Documents and Data Analyzed  
Document Data analyzed 
European Financial Stability Facility 
Framework Agreement (EFSF, 2011) 
Terms, legal structure, and organization of the 
EFSF and amount of individual member state 
commitments  
European Stability Mechanism Treaty - 
consolidated version following Lithuania's 
accession to the ESM (ESM, 2015) 
Terms, legal structure, and organization of the 
ESM and amount of individual member state 
commitments 
Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination, and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (European Council, 2012) 
Content and legal structure of the Fiscal 
Compact 
Leadership in Hard Times: Germany, France, 
and the Management of the Eurozone Crisis 
(Schild, 2013) 
Data from interviews with government 
officials from France and Germany 
The Court of Justice approves the creation of 
the European Stability Mechanism outside the 
EU legal order: Pringle (de Witte & Beukers, 
2013) 
Legal assessment of the EFSF and the ESM 
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Suspending vetoes: how the euro countries 
achieved unanimity in the fiscal compact 
(Tsebelis & Hahm, 2014) 
Comparison of the individual drafts of the 
Fiscal Compact and tracking of the 
corresponding negotiations 
Time Will Tell: The EFSF, the ESM, and the 
Euro Crisis (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013) 
In-depth information/analysis of the Franco-
German partnership in the face of the 
European debt crisis 
Apart from the seven main documents presented above, the document analysis 
will be supported by a number of less significant resources that are used as 
sources for some specific, individual circumstances. Because their representation 
would go beyond the scope of this chapter, the presentation of those individual 
sources was waived.  
 
The assessment of the policy making processes leading to the three chosen 
counter-measures to the European debt crisis will be organized according to the 
following structure.  
First, the general framework of the respective measure will be briefly 
described. Second, it will be assessed whether the most important prerequisite for 
Neorealism, anarchy, was given as the basis for a decision explainable by 
Neorealism. Following this, the decision-making process for each counter-
measure will be presented and it will be constituted whether specific state 
coalitions can be identified that were the driving forces behind the implementation 
of the individual counter-measures. Finally, it will be assessed whether the design 
of each counter-measure should be regarded as supranational or 
intergovernmental. 
Following a chronological order, the implementation of the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) will be analyzed first, followed by the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and then the European Fiscal Compact. 
  
6.1.3 Limitations and Potential Biases 
The qualitative analysis of this thesis is affected by two main limitations. Those 
are, firstly, the limited number of analyzed documents, and, secondly, the use of 
secondary sources. 
 As table 2 shows, the analysis will rely on seven main documents which are 
split into official documents (the treaties implementing the counter-measures) and 
studies conducted on the topic. In general, it could be presumed that the reliability 
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of qualitative research would increase with the amount of used sources. In the 
specific case of the method of document analysis, however, as has been 
mentioned before, the researcher should not be so much concerned with the 
quantity of the analyzed documents but rather their specific suitability and the 
amount of useful information they bear for the individual case of the analysis. 
Hence, every effort has been made to ensure a composition of the analyzed 
documents that provides an optimal suitability for the case of this study.  
Besides the amount of analyzed documents, the inclusion of secondary sources, 
respectively studies conducted on the topic at hand, implies a limitation in itself. 
Naturally, secondary sources are always influenced by the socialization of the 
respective issuer and the process of their individual compilation. However, since 
it was not possible to consult first-hand witnesses of the negotiation process, for 
example through interviews, the analysis must rely on secondary sources for this 
part of the thesis. Being aware of the aforementioned problem of possible 
personal or institutional influences by the authors of the respective studies, the 
data which has been taken from those studies has been chosen with due diligence. 
 
 
6.2 Reaching Agreement in International Negotiations 
This short subchapter will underline the conditions that have to be met in the 
international system in order to achieve cooperation, may it be in the form of an 
international treaty or other, similar, forms of cooperation. 
The signing of international treaties always bears one central obstacle that has 
to be overcome in order for the treaty negotiations to be successful: unanimity of 
all signing parties. Every state that is supposed to be part of an international treaty 
has to accept its conditions or otherwise it can simply chose to opt out and not to 
sign the treaty. 
This prevalence might not be of particular importance in situations where the 
respective treaty is an agreement which does not necessarily require all states‟ 
participation. In the special case of the European debt crisis, however, any treaty 
to be signed required the participation of the whole Eurozone in order to be 
effective. The Eurozone‟s characteristic as a monetary union which is deeply 
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financially entangled made it necessary to show unity and strength towards the 
financial markets in order to calm the situation and rebuild confidence in the Euro. 
As, in this case, each state possesses a veto power it is of outmost importance 
to persuade, or coerce, each individual state to participate in the treaty and to not 
use its veto power. From this angle, the creation of the three counter-measures 
analyzed in the following subchapters should be looked at. It should be borne in 
mind that the implementation of each of those policies had to be achieved through 
unanimity among the Eurozone states. A special case presents the European Fiscal 
Compact which, although made under unanimity, did not require the ratification 
of all Eurozone countries in order to go into effect (European Council, 2012, p. 
22). The implications of this particular content will be discussed in section 6.5.1. 
  
 
6.3 European Financial Stability Facility 
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was, after the hastily adopted 
stability support loans to Greece in May 2010, the first big measure that was taken 
in the framework of the Eurozone in order to set up a range of policy measures 
aimed at countering the European debt crisis. Its purpose is to  
financially support euro-area Member States in difficulties caused by exceptional 
circumstances beyond such euro-area Member States' control with the aim of safeguarding the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States (EFSF, 2011, p. 1). 
The EFSF was incorporated on June 7
th
, 2010 and became fully functional on 
August 4
th
, 2010 when Italy ratified the framework agreement and thus 90% of the 
guarantee commitments had been provided (EFSF, 2010). It was implemented as 
a temporary mechanism to calm the financial markets which were in turmoil over 
the severe financial situation of Greece and the possible resulting implications for 
the whole Eurozone. The EFSF was given a lending capacity of up to 780 billion 
Euros in 2011, after the capital was increased from 440 billion Euros to 780 
billion Euros in October 2011. The share of the contributions that each member 
state holds are as follows:  
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Figure 5: Share of guarantee commitments to the EFSF  
 
It is important to note that Greece, Ireland, and Portugal have become „Stepping-
Out Guarantors‟ which means that they refrained from further guarantees and 
accordingly lost their rights to participate in subsequent voting of the EFSF 
(EFSF, 2011, p. 22). 
 
6.3.1 Implementation Process, Coalition Building, and Prevalence of 
Anarchy 
In order to find evidence for the argument that the establishment of the EFSF 
follows Neorealist predictions it is necessary to explore under which 
circumstances the EFSF was created and whether it was negotiated under anarchic 
conditions or within the law framework of a superordinate institution, like the 
European Union. Subsequently, it will be explored how the actual legal 
framework is designed and whether its decision-making procedure is mainly 
supranational or intergovernmental. 
An in-depth exploration of the EFSF‟s legal framework shows that it is neither 
an institution of the European Union, nor an international organization but a 
private company incorporated in Luxembourg with the only shareholders of the 
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company being the Eurozone states (EFSF, 2011, p. 1). Furthermore, the EFSF 
was not a treaty established under European Union law but an executive 
agreement between the leaders of the Eurozone countries (EFSF, 2011, p. 1). It 
was thus not negotiated within the institutional framework of the European 
Council. Indeed, observers of the negotiation process indicate that  
the members of the Council from the 17 euro area countries “switched hats” and transformed 
themselves into representatives of their States at an informal diplomatic conference; in that 
capacity, they adopted a decision by which they committed themselves to establish a European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) outside the EU legal framework. (de Witte & Beukers, 
2013, p. 808) 
In short, the leaders of the Eurozone purposely left the area of the European 
Council in order to reach a decision under common international law. This step 
outside of the European Union framework led to a backslide into the anarchy of 
the international system as assumed by Neorealism. Since the supranational 
institutions of the European Union were virtually left out of the negotiation and 
implementation process, the states became the only and thus dominant actors 
again. The absence of any superordinate institution then enabled power politics 
and the interests of the powerful states to be forced upon the weaker states. 
 
After having shown that the most important prerequisite of Neorealism, anarchy, 
was prevalent during the implementation and creation of the EFSF, in the 
following paragraphs, it will be examined whose preferences have been dominant 
during the implementation process. 
As has been mentioned before, the EFSF was negotiated in turbulent times 
when the financial markets were in great turmoil and there was rising concern of 
the Eurozone falling apart if some of its member states were to go bankrupt. In 
this troubling situation, it was particularly two member states of the Eurozone 
who pushed forward counter-measures to the crisis and took leadership roles in 
the implementation process: Germany and France. These two states dominated the 
negotiation processes and took a leading role in designing and finally 
implementing the EFSF (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013; Schild, 2013). 
On the one hand, Germany‟s and France‟s considerable financial power 
enabled the two states to take a leadership position in handling the crisis, but, on 
the other hand, also committed them to take action because their high financial 
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investments might be in danger if the Eurozone were to fail to cope with the crisis. 
It was thus a two-edged sword with which France and Germany had to deal and 
involved a high risk both for immense negative externalities for the relationship of 
the two states, as well as economic repercussions for the whole of the Eurozone. 
The main reason for the cooperation of these two states to tackle the crisis 
resulted from their similar interest to prevent massive financial damage to their 
economies. It was in the interest of both Germany and France to achieve a fast and 
effective solution to the impending Greek default (Schild, 2013). After the two 
countries had decided to take the leading role, the cooperation efforts between 
France and Germany even went so far that they agreed to bilaterally coordinate 
their positions in the framework of the counter-measures to the debt crisis ahead 
of all important Eurozone meetings in order to ensure a joint appearance (Schild, 
2013, p. 32). Joachim Schild identified at least 20 of such bilateral meetings 
between 2010 and 2012 (ibid., p. 34). Furthermore, the hallmarks of German-
Franco leadership and exercise of power are also evident in the composition of the 
EFSF‟s management board, which is led by the German Klaus Regling and his 
deputy Christophe Frankel, a Frenchman (EFSF, 2015a; EFSF, 2015b). 
It should be noted that there were other states proposing solutions to the crisis, 
such as Belgium which suggested a European Debt Agency that would act as a 
central administrator of the Eurozone debt and was supposed to negotiate 
common interest rates for new debt (Leterme, 2010). However, those proposals 
were rejected in the light of the Franco-German leadership pushing forward their 
own solution (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013, p. 243). 
 
6.3.2 The Institutional Design: Intergovernmental or Supranational? 
As has been shown, the implementation of the EFSF was pushed forward by the 
two (financially) most powerful states of the Eurozone. So far, the implementation 
process is thus consistent with Neorealist predictions. What is then of interest is 
whether the EFSF shows a more intergovernmental or supranational design. 
As mentioned before, the EFSF was established outside the European Union 
legal framework and can thus be regarded as the product of negotiations under 
anarchy. The meeting of this prerequisite then enabled power politics, as assumed 
by Neorealism, to take center stage in the negotiation process. Since there were no 
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authoritative institutions above the states which could influence the 
implementation in a structuring way, Germany and France were able to shape the 
Eurozone‟s crisis management according to their preferences. It is evident that the 
implementation of the EFSF outside of the European Union framework with the 
states as the only shareholders of the company makes the EFSF an 
intergovernmental measure. However, it is interesting to explore whether this 
intergovernmental nature is also reflected in the internal design of the 
organization. 
 
During the creation of the EFSF, the question arose whether the European Council 
or the European Commission should be entrusted with the design and the 
implementation of the mechanism (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013). Naturally, the bodies 
of the European Union strived for some form of control over a mechanism that 
has such significant impact on the financial well-being of the Eurozone states. 
However, efforts of the Commission to implement a stabilization fund within the 
framework of the European Union aimed towards selling bonds and borrowing 
new credit using guarantees from member states were denied by Germany 
(Barber, 2010). Although, in the end, the legal framework of the EFSF includes 
observer rights for the European Commission and the European Central Bank 
(EFSF, 2011, p. 23) it is far from being a European Union institution. 
Apart from refusing a significant participation of the supranational bodies of 
the European Union, the intergovernmental character of the EFSF is also reflected 
in its institutional design and voting procedures. The decision-making of the EFSF 
follows two distinct procedures. While the first procedure is the adopting of 
decisions through simple majority, the other is unanimous decision-making 
(EFSF, 2011, p. 24). While in unanimous decision-making the approval of all 
states is needed, the voting rights of each member state in simple majority voting 
are equal to the share of its contributions to the EFSF‟s capital stock. Simple 
majority voting is used for the majority of administrative and operational 
decisions (EFSF, 2011, p. 25f.). Unanimous decision-making, however, comes 
into practice for the most important decisions, namely decisions of principal 
nature or the provision of loans in order to support member states in case of 
trouble (EFSF, 2011, p. 24).  
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As a result, the institutional design of the EFSF should be regarded as 
intergovernmental rather than supranational, as governments play the central role 
in its decision-making procedures while the European Union‟s supranational 
institutions are granted barely any influence. Furthermore, its primary purpose, 
the provision of loans, is determined by an intergovernmental way of decision-
making.  
 
 
6.4 European Stability Mechanism 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was the second major measure 
implemented to counter the European debt crisis and was established at the end of 
September 2012 (ESM, 2015). Its purpose is to “mobilise funding and provide 
stability support […] to the benefit of ESM Members which are experiencing, or 
are threatened by, severe financing problems […] to safeguard the financial 
stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States” (ESM, 2015, p. 
10). 
As such, it suits the same purpose as the EFSF and can be seen as the successor 
to the EFSF. Contrary to the EFSF, however, the ESM is not a rather informal 
executive agreement but an international treaty (de Witte & Beukers, 2013, p. 
812). The main reason behind the implementation of the ESM as successor to the 
EFSF was the need for a permanent rescue mechanism, instead of a temporary one 
like the EFSF, in order to calm the financial markets which were still in turmoil 
over the impending default of Greece.  
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Figure 6: Share of capital subscription to the ESM  
 
As can be seen in figure 6, the share of capital subscription to the ESM 
corresponds to the shares of the EFSF and is oriented towards the equity interest 
each state holds in the capital of the European Central Bank. 
 
6.4.1 Implementation Process, Coalition Building, and Prevalence of 
Anarchy 
The ongoing European debt crisis and the still existing threat of a chain reaction 
of state insolvencies forced the Eurozone states to take further measures beyond 
the 2010 implemented EFSF. However, some member states, particularly 
Germany, were against an adaptation or extension of the EFSF because of its 
temporary nature and the resulting diminished effect on the financial markets. As 
Gocaj & Meunier (2013) constitute: “Germany was adamantly opposed to 
expanding the EFSF‟s powers but supported […] a permanent rescue mechanism 
that would allow a method for orderly default” (ibid., p. 247). As a result, the 
creation of a permanent rescue mechanism, the ESM, was accelerated. 
Just like the EFSF, the ESM was created outside of the European Union legal 
framework. In fact, the foundation of the ESM followed a very similar process to 
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the design of the EFSF. The main reason for that was the path dependency which 
the EFSF induced (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013). The immense political costs that the 
creation of the EFSF already demanded paved the way for a similar, but 
permanent, institution. If the states had chosen a completely new rescue structure 
with different mechanisms, the bargaining processes on the national and the 
international level would have started again. Given the urgency for action to calm 
the financial markets and to stabilize the financial situations in some of the 
member states it seemed easier and less costly to rely on already proven 
mechanisms (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013, p. 249). As a result, the functioning of the 
ESM and the EFSF is very similar which is not only reflected in the fact that they 
were both implemented outside the European Union legal framework but also in 
their institutional design.  
Similar to the implementation process of the EFSF, the adoption of the ESM as 
a permanent version of the EFSF was particularly expedited by a coalition 
between Germany and France. In the highly debated joint declaration of 
Deauville, Angela Merkel and Nikolas Sarkozy called for the establishment of 
what would later become the ESM (European Council, 2010). The perceived need 
for an expanded rescue mechanism that was able to provide stability was also 
shared by the troubled Eurozone states. Member states that had received aid from 
the EFSF spoke out for an implementation of a permanent mechanism as 
suggested by France and Germany. Ireland, for instance, expected lower interest 
rates from a change of the present mechanism, while Portugal mainly criticized 
the delays of the EFSF in providing aid when needed (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013, p. 
247; Wise, 2011). 
As a result, the implementation of the ESM as a permanent version of the 
EFSF reflected the preferences of the powerful Franco-German coalition with 
support from several states in need of financial support. Furthermore, the 
management board of the ESM is composed of the same leadership team as the 
EFSF with the German Klaus Regling as CEO and the French Christophe Frankel 
as his deputy (ESM, 2015). This composition can be seen as another evidence of 
the Franco-German decisive influence. 
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6.4.2 The Institutional Design: Intergovernmental or Supranational? 
Unlike the EFSF, which is a private company, the ESM is an international 
organization. Despite this difference, the EFSF and the ESM both show strong 
intergovernmental features.  
Bodies of the European Union were integrated in the legal framework of the 
ESM by granting the European Commission and the European Central Bank the 
right to send observers to the meetings, though they do not have any voting rights 
(ESM, 2015, p. 14). The decision-making procedure of the ESM is similar to the 
procedure of the EFSF with the exception that qualified majority voting of 80 
percent has been added to the two procedures of the EFSF: simple majority, and 
unanimous decision-making. While simple majority voting is only used for very 
few administrative tasks, qualified majority voting is used for decisions 
concerning the personnel of the ESM or other operational tasks (ESM, 2015, p. 
16f.). As for the EFSF, however, unanimity is required for the most important 
decisions such as providing financial support to troubled member states (ESM, 
2015, p. 15). All in all, it can thus be concluded that the ESM, just like the EFSF, 
is based on an intergovernmental rather than a supranational institutional 
structure.    
 
 
6.5 European Fiscal Compact 
Being the third major counter-measure against the effects of the European debt 
crisis, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union, also known as the European Fiscal Compact, completes the 
policies analyzed here. Its purpose is to 
strengthen the economic pillar of the economic and monetary union by adopting a set of rules 
intended to foster budgetary discipline […], to strengthen the coordination of their economic 
policies and to improve the governance of the euro area, thereby supporting the achievement of 
the European Union's objectives for sustainable growth, employment, competitiveness and 
social cohesion. (European Council, 2012, p. 9)  
The Fiscal Compact represents another attempt to foster economic and fiscal 
discipline in the Eurozone and stands in close connection to the other 
implemented measures. In fact, the granting of financial assistance from the ESM 
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was made conditional on the ratification of the European Fiscal Compact as of 
March 2013 (European Council, 2012, p. 7). This restriction was the result of 
Germany‟s and France‟s interest in preventing reluctant member states of the 
Eurozone from defecting from the rules implemented with the Fiscal Compact 
(Schild, 2013, p. 38). 
Contrary to the ESM, and its predecessor EFSF, however, the Fiscal Compact 
was designed to be applicable to the whole of the European Union, not 
exclusively the Eurozone. Nevertheless, the obligations set by the Fiscal Compact 
differ between the member states of the Eurozone and the rest of the European 
Union. European Union member states that are not part of the Eurozone may 
decide on a voluntary basis whether they want to fulfill the provisions of the 
Fiscal Compact or not. Legally binding nature is only set for the member states 
“whose currency is the euro” (European Council, 2012, p. 8). The Fiscal Compact 
was signed by 25 of the then 27 member states of the European Union, with the 
exception of the United Kingdom and Czech Republic (European Council, 2012). 
 
6.5.1 Implementation Process, Coalition Building, and Prevalence of 
Anarchy 
Just as the implementation processes of the EFSF and the ESM, the adaption of 
the Fiscal Compact was characterized by the leadership of Germany and France. 
Having experienced the Franco-German alliance that pushed the rescue 
mechanisms of the EFSF and the ESM forward by relying on bilateral 
consultations and their joint power, other member states “even refrained from 
submitting their own contributions to the crucial debates on […] the fiscal 
compact, taking a reactive stance towards the proposals emanating from Franco-
German consultations” (Schild, 2013, p. 36). 
The negotiations for the Fiscal Compact were, right from the beginning, 
outlined by Germany with reluctant support from France. Germany, being the 
largest creditor and one of the very few Eurozone states with a positive net 
lending figure, wanted this treaty to bind the other member states to tougher fiscal 
rules in order to avoid future debt crises (Schild, 2013). Although the German 
position initially was to change the European Union treaties in order to embed 
stricter fiscal rules in primary European Union law, the refusal of the United 
66 
 
Kingdom to participate in the Fiscal Compact made this goal unattainable (Gocaj 
& Meunier, 2013).  
Germany, unable to persuade the United Kingdom to follow its proposal, did 
not give up its leadership position and decided to step out of the European Union 
legal framework and to push forward a treaty under international law. That the 
other member states followed this proposal, and finally agreed to a treaty that 
mirrored the demands of Germany (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2014), can be seen as 
evidence for the power position of Germany in the Eurozone. 
 
Within the negotiation process for the implementation of the Fiscal Compact, it 
became clear yet again that no powerful opposition to the Franco-German 
coalition existed. Although the southern states, such as Spain and Italy refrained 
from the idea of stronger fiscal rules within the Eurozone, they had no option of 
forming a coalition of states which would have been able to build a powerful 
opposition to France and Germany. The high financial pressure resting on both 
Spain and Italy thus forced them to align once more with the interests pushed 
forward by the alliance of France and Germany (Schild, 2013, p. 37). 
In addition to this, Merkel and Sarkozy made it very clear that they would be 
willing to use their power if necessary to “„force march‟ the eurozone towards 
stricter rules to ensure that a debt crisis could never happen again” (Tsebelis & 
Hahm, 2014, p. 1396). The immense pressure that was put on the Eurozone states 
to adopt stricter fiscal rules in a very short time is also displayed by the length of 
the negotiations. The Fiscal Compact was pushed through in a very short period of 
time with only two months between the first draft until the final version (Tsebelis 
& Hahm, 2014). 
Furthermore, the forcefulness and power with which Germany and France 
wanted to enforce new regulatory fiscal mechanisms for the Eurozone is also 
displayed in a special feature of the Fiscal Compact. Since it is an international 
treaty, it required the unanimous consent of all signing parties to be decided upon. 
However, in order to ensure that its binding fiscal rules apply to all signatories, 
Article 14(2) of the treaty includes a clause that the rules of the treaty come into 
force when at least 12 member states of the Eurozone ratified the treaty (European 
Council, 2012, p. 22). This clause was implemented following pressure from 
Germany and France which wanted to ensure that all signatories followed their 
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described obligations and would not let the treaty fail due to a missing ratification 
of a national government (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2014). 
 
6.5.2 The Institutional Design: Intergovernmental or Supranational? 
Because the United Kingdom refused any participation in the proposed treaty, the 
states decided to move out of the European Union legal framework during a 
European Council meeting between December 8 and 9, 2011 (European Council, 
2011, p. 7). Subsequently, the treaty to be adopted was decided to be an 
intergovernmental treaty under international law. 
However, although the Fiscal Compact is an international treaty outside 
European Union law, it incorporates several institutions of the European Union. 
For instance, the monitoring of the fiscal rules was assigned to the European 
Commission (European Council, 2012, p. 14). The Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), on the other hand, has been commissioned to rule on the 
implementation of the Fiscal Compact‟s rules into national law of the respective 
member states. For all other rules, for instance the compliance of national budgets 
with the principles specified in the treaty, the CJEU has no jurisdiction (European 
Council, 2012, p. 5). 
The European institutions have thus been granted only very limited influence. 
Although the European Commission has been enabled to monitor compliance with 
the fiscal rules, it has not been given the power to sanction possible violation of 
those rules (European Council, 2012). As a result, while disregarding the rules of 
the Fiscal Compact may imply negative externalities imposed from other 
signatories of the treaty, negative consequences imposed by the European Union 
institutions would not be expected. The institutional design of the Fiscal Compact 
shows that, on the one hand, European Union institutions have been superficially 
integrated into the treaty, when it comes to critical issues, however, they have not 
been granted much power. 
To sum it up, just like the EFSF and the ESM, the European Fiscal Compact 
can be regarded as reflecting mainly intergovernmental rather than supranational 
traits. 
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6.6 Summarizing Assessment 
Now that the evidence from the qualitative analysis has been collected, several 
statements can be made concerning the congruence of the three analyzed counter-
measures and Neorealist predictions. 
Firstly, all three counter-measures have been implemented outside of the 
European Union legal framework. This means that they were negotiated outside 
the structuring influence of the legislature of the European Union and the 
involvement of the European Commission and the European Parliament. As a 
result, leaving this superordinate framework represents a step back into the 
anarchy of the international system. Within the negotiations for the counter-
measures, the member states of the Eurozone acted as representatives of their 
states just like they would at any other international conference. Neorealism‟s 
most prevalent prerequisite, anarchy, was thus met. 
Secondly, the cooperation patterns that could be observed during the 
negotiations of the measures reflected the financial power relations within the 
Eurozone. Germany and France, the two most powerful actors, together disposing 
of more of half the financial power distribution in the Eurozone, were the two 
leading actors in the negotiations and decisively shaped their outcomes. It could 
be observed that Germany did do even more than France, which is compatible 
with the state‟s status as the financially most powerful country of the Eurozone. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that the weaker states have not been able to push 
through their interests and, in the later stages of the negotiations, even refrained 
from bringing in significant own proposals of how to deal with the crisis. 
Thirdly, the institutional design of all three counter-measures clearly favors 
intergovernmental over supranational structures. This is particularly evident in the 
voting procedures implemented in the EFSF and the ESM which rely on 
unanimity as the procedure to pass the most important decisions, namely the 
providing of financial assistance. The intergovernmental character of the Fiscal 
Compact becomes evident in the roles that have been assigned to the European 
institutions which can be regarded as being no more than superficial.  
To sum it up, all three analyzed counter-measures were implemented under 
anarchy, reflected the financial power relations within the Eurozone, and followed 
an intergovernmental rather than a supranational design. 
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7 Discussion 
After having summarized the qualitative evidence, the question remains how 
those outcomes shall be interpreted and what meaning can be attributed to them. 
What seems to be apparent is that the crisis situation in the course of the 
European debt crisis initiated a strong demand for European leadership. However, 
the qualitative evidence of this thesis has shown that, despite all previous 
integrating efforts, the supranational European institutions have not taken the 
leading role in the crisis management but the leadership rather originated from 
individual member states that were powerful enough to push forward their 
interests. Naturally, in such a situation in which the state becomes the dominant 
actor again, Neorealism becomes more relevant. 
In fact, as has been shown, it is indeed possible to see and interpret the crisis 
management of the Eurozone states through the lens of Neorealism. What 
Neorealism would predict, that the most powerful states take a leadership role by 
pushing forward their interests, and if necessary force their will on others, has 
happened. The financial power Germany and France had at their disposal during 
the crisis enabled them to take this leadership role, without having to severely fear 
being challenged by other member states of the Eurozone. Even other powerful 
states like Italy were not able to contest the German-Franco leadership. Although 
Italy could have potentially been a part of a “trio” of powerful states, the 
country‟s problems concerning defensive financial power seems to have 
prevented a stronger leading role in the negotiation processes. 
Still, the question has to be asked why Germany and France cooperated 
throughout the whole phase of crisis management instead of free-riding or 
pursuing their interests on their own or via a different coalition. The most likely 
explanation for this is that neither France nor Germany were able to build a 
winning coalition on crucial issues without relying on the other state as a partner. 
This is backed by the power relations identified in the quantitative part which 
prove that it would have been indeed very difficult for either country to form a 
coalition that would have been decisive without the other. Thus, it seems 
reasonable that they cooperated, building a strong coalition which was able to 
almost fully dictate the policy making in response to the crisis. That the other 
70 
 
member states of the Eurozone decided to follow the lead of the two countries 
could be explained by their fear of greater loss if they would have decided not to 
participate in a joint crisis management. Presumably, the negative externalities of 
free-riding were perceived as being higher than the potential losses the weaker 
states would have to face if they did not choose to cooperate. 
 
All in all, the findings might suggest that the theory of Neorealism should be 
revisited and its suitability to explain the politics in the European Union should be 
reassessed. 
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8 Conclusion 
The two research questions of this thesis asked: “How was financial state power 
distributed among the states of the Eurozone between 2009 and 2014?” and, 
”Can the fiscal counter-measures taken in the course of the European debt crisis 
be explained by the theory of Neorealism?”.  
The exploration of the first question, approached through a quantitative 
analysis has shown that, within the Eurozone, Germany and France had the most 
financial power with Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain forming the least 
powerful group of states in 2010. The latter three states, however, were found to 
improve significantly until 2014 leaving Greece alone as the state with a lack in 
both offensive and defensive financial state power.  
In the next step, the qualitative analysis, it has been shown that those power 
relations were reflected in the process of implementing three counter-measures to 
the European debt crisis. Together with their intergovernmental design and their 
negotiation under anarchy, the creation of the EFSF, the ESM, and the Fiscal 
Compact were found to be consistent with Neorealist predictions.  
This thesis has thus shown that the implementation of the three most important 
counter-measures to the European debt crisis can be explained and analyzed 
through the theory of Neorealism. What is remarkable about this finding is that it 
seems to stand in contrast to the ongoing scholarly debate around Neorealism and 
the European Union which regards the former as not being applicable to the latter. 
However, this thesis has shown that in a time of severe crisis, the states of the 
Eurozone engaged in a solution finding which followed Neorealist predictions and 
turned its back to the supranational framework of the European Union for the sake 
of an intergovernmental way that was decisively shaped by the financially most 
powerful member states of the Eurozone.  
The findings of this thesis then suggest that Neorealism still bears explanatory 
power for the analysis of the European Union which might call for a reanimation 
of the theory‟s application to the specific European framework. Further 
investigation of the identified mechanisms is needed in order to test whether this 
falling back into Neorealist behavior is a common occurrence for states in times 
of crisis. Even without further investigation, however, the findings of this thesis 
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can contribute to the theoretical discussion surrounding the entanglement of the 
European Union and the suitability of certain International Relations theories to 
explain the unique object of research that is the European Union.  
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